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ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Kiyoung Jeon, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
This dissertation analyzes the sovereign default risk and trade of emerging countries. In
the first two chapters, I investigate the default risk by laying particular emphasis on labor
markets and income inequality. In Chapter 2, I propose a general equilibrium model with
endogenous sovereign default. I assume that firms need to borrow from foreign lenders to
finance a fraction of the cost of labor (also referred to as working capital conditions). In
the model, the labor channel can amplify the effect of adverse TFP shocks on default risk.
The main finding is that working capital conditions play a significant role in generating
endogenous drops in output and labor in defaults. In addition, the model explains the main
features of the business cycles observed in emerging markets, such as countercyclical spreads,
procyclical labor, and high volatility of consumption relative to output, when calibrated to
Argentine data.
In Chapter 3, I analyze income inequality as another channel that influences a country’s
risk of default. I extend a standard endogenous sovereign default model by including in-
equality shocks. The main finding is that inequality shocks can amplify the effect of output
shocks on sovereign default risk. Moreover, the model generates reasonable business cycle
characteristics of Argentina, and the consumption volatility of poor households relative to
rich households is matched well with a data set on Mexico. Lastly, as a policy extension, I
extend the model by introducing progressive income taxes and find that as the progressivity
of the tax increases, the default risk decreases.
In Chapter 4, aside from the sovereign default risk, I examine export behavior of firms
as another aspect of emerging countries. I use three empirical methods for a Chilean plant-
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level data set. I find evidence that firms with high productivity are more likely to become
exporters and that firms enhance their productivity by participating in export markets.
Furthermore, I show that the productivity growth of export firms is persistent even in a
recession. Overall, my findings provide a better understanding of the effects of labor markets
and income inequality on sovereign default risk and the productivity growth induced by
exports.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation analyzes the sovereign default risk and trade of emerging countries. Emerg-
ing market economies are different from advanced countries in many dimensions. They are
characterized by higher default risk, more volatile employment, and higher income inequality
than more advanced economies. They also experience larger drops in GDP and employment
during default episodes. In view of these facts, labor markets and income inequality may
influence the government’s incentives to borrow. I place a particular focus on the role of
these two channels in generating the sovereign default risk. Along with these characteristics,
emerging market economies have a significant share in the international trade. I investigate
export behavior of individual firms and see if exports can explain productivity growth of
firms in emerging countries. The connection between export decisions and firm productivity
may shed light on the link between export-oriented growth and economic success.
In this dissertation, the first two chapters deal with the sovereign default risk and business
cycles in emerging countries. Chapter 2 starts by investigating sovereign default risk through
the labor channel, which has not received much attention in prior literature. Specifically, I
explore the role labor markets play in the sovereign default risk among emerging economies. I
propose a general equilibrium model with endogenous sovereign default. I assume that firms
need to borrow from foreign lenders to finance a fraction of the cost of labor (also referred to
as working capital conditions). In addition, I assume that interest rates on working capital
loans are correlated with interest rate spreads on government bonds; which is a stylized fact
observed in the data. Under this assumption, the labor channel can amplify the effect of
adverse TFP shocks on sovereign default risk. Specifically, firms may demand less labor if
the economy is hit by a low TFP shock. Consequently, equilibrium wages and output would
decline. Since foreign lenders have perfect information about the state of the economy
1
and the TFP shock process, they will demand higher premiums on government bonds. As
borrowing becomes more expensive, firms face higher interest rates on working capital loans.
As a result, firms cut back their production resulting in a higher default risk in the economy.
This allows me to show that working capital conditions play a significant role in generating
endogenous drops in output and labor in defaults. In addition, the model explains the main
features of the business cycles observed in emerging markets. These include countercyclical
spreads, procyclical labor, and high volatility of consumption relative to output, when the
model is calibrated to Argentine data.
While Chapter 2 examines the link between the default risk and the labor market, Chap-
ter 3 considers the effect of income inequality on sovereign default risk. Specifically, I in-
vestigate how changes in income inequality affect governments’ decisions on borrowing and
defaulting. First, I conduct an empirical analysis using data that cover the period 1994-2010
for 45 countries. I show that there exists a negative correlation between the Gini indices
and countries’ creditworthiness (measured by the credit ratings of the government bonds).
Second, to study the role of income inequality in default risk, I extend a standard endoge-
nous sovereign default model by introducing heterogeneous agents. In addition to output
shocks, I adopt shocks to income distribution (also referred to as inequality shocks). The
government makes decisions on borrowing and defaulting to maximize the life-time utility
of households. In the model, inequality shocks amplify the effect of output shocks on the
endowments of households, such that there is a larger dispersion in the marginal utilities of
consumption across agents as well as across time when the economy receives low output and
high inequality shocks. This induces the government to borrow more from foreign lenders,
which increases spreads. However, as borrowing becomes more expensive, the government
needs to impose higher taxes on households in order to roll over its debt. Increases in taxes
generate an even larger dispersion in the marginal utilities of consumption between house-
holds. In this case, instead of issuing more debt, the government chooses to default on
its debt to eliminate the tax burden on households. This allows me to show that inequality
shocks can amplify the effect of output shocks on sovereign default risk. I calibrate the model
to match a number of stylized facts for Argentina. Quantitatively, the results show that the
default probability with output shocks alone is 0.5 percent. In contrast, with two shocks it
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is 3 percent. This highlights the role of inequality shocks as a channel that amplifies the
default risk. Next, I calibrate the model to match the business cycle statistics of Mexico. A
data set on Mexico is useful to test the performance of the model with heterogeneous agents
since it provides information for the level of consumption across different income groups.
The consumption volatility of poor households relative to rich households is matched well
with the data. Lastly, as a policy extension, I extend the model to look at whether the
progressive tax system has any effect on the default risk. I find that as the progressivity of
the tax increases, the default risk decreases. In effect, the economy has lower mean spreads
and can sustain larger levels of debt.
Aside from the sovereign default risk, more emerging countries tend to participate in
export markets, so the volume of exports from emerging countries has grown over time.
Chapter 4 looks into emerging economies from this aspect. I conduct an empirical study
on Chilean plants during 1995-2007 to examine if firms with high productivity are more
likely to become exporters and if firms in emerging countries improve their productivity by
participating in export markets. To answer the first question (the self-selection hypothesis),
I use the regression method and the stochastic dominance method. In particular, I regress
the probability of becoming an exporter on the productivity and other control variables such
as the size of firms and the ratio of skilled labor. In the stochastic dominance method,
I compare the entire productivity distribution of export plants and non-exporting plants
rather than marginal moment. Using these two methods, I find evidence that supports the
self-selection hypothesis. For the second question (the learning-by-exporting hypothesis), I
make use of the matched sampling technique and the regression method. In the matched
sampling technique, I compare the productivity of export plants when they actually export
and when they hypothetically do not export. Since export plants that hypothetically do not
export are not observed in the data, I use a propensity score method to find non-exporting
plants which have productivity similar with export plants in the beginning of the sample
period. These non-exporting plants are the control group and the export plants are the
treated group. By comparing productivity of the treated group and the control group, I
show that the learning effect is persistent for two years after entry into export markets. In
addition, plants who stay in export markets during the whole sample period enhance their
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productivity as well. In the regression method, I categorize plants as seven types. Among
these types, I expect that entrants-stay and permanent exporters will gain the benefits from
participating in export markets. I find that they enhance their productivity by participating
in export markets compared to non-exporting plants. In addition to these two hypotheses,
I consider a short recession in 1999 in Chile and see if it affects the productivity growth
of export plants. Using the regression method, I find evidence that supports the learning
effect even in a recession. Lastly, I examine the productivity growth within export plants.
In particular, I compare the productivity growth of export plants between before and after
entry into export markets using the regression method. The result indicates that there is no
significant difference in productivity growth of export plants before and after entry.
Understanding emerging economies is crucial since their impact on the global economy is
growing significantly. In light of this fact, this dissertation explores emerging economies from
two different aspects. My main findings provide a better understanding of default risk in
emerging economies and the productivity growth induced by exports. I explain how working
capital conditions and income inequality incur high interest rates resulting in a high default
risk in emerging markets. In addition, I provide evidence on the impact of export on the
productivity growth of firms in emerging countries.
4
2.0 SOVEREIGN RISK AND PRIVATE CREDIT IN LABOR MARKETS1
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This paper examines sovereign default risk in emerging countries from a different viewpoint.
Emerging economies experience countercyclical spreads over the business cycles, which are
associated with default risk.2 In addition, since emerging markets are also characterized
by procyclical labor, labor will decrease after drops in output in default. In this paper, we
focus on the labor market as a channel that amplifies the default risk in emerging economies.
We propose a theory that links these observations such that financing of labor costs plays a
critical role in generating countercyclical spreads, endogenous drops in output and procyclical
labor. Particularly, we ask what is the role of labor markets in the default risk observed in
emerging markets? Moreover, we address the question how they are related to the drops in
output observed after sovereign defaults.
The stylized empirical facts for emerging economies are presented in Figure 2.1, focusing
on a subset of countries that includes Argentina, Korea, Greece, and Spain. We look at the
detrended real GDP and employment for these countries. Consistent with the findings in the
literature shown by Li (2011), Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006), we find
that employment tends to move together with real GDP in these four emerging countries
over the business cycle. In addition, in recession, the labor drops with the output drops in
these economies.
1This research is a joint work with Zeynep Kabukcuoglu.
2Emerging economies tend to experience high risk of debt crisis and have incurred substantial losses in
income from defaults in history. In Tomz and Wright (2013), they examined 251 defaults by 107 distinct
entities and the most frequent defaulters are Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Similarly, Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009) summarize that defaulting countries are mostly emerging economies since 1900 in history.
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Figure 2.1: GDP and employment in emerging countries
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In this paper, we examine these features of emerging markets using a stochastic general
equilibrium model in a small open economy. The economy is subject to aggregate uncertainty
about productivity. The problem of the representative households is standard in that they
make consumption and labor decisions that optimize their life time utility subject to a budget
constraint that entails wages, transfers from the government and profits from the firms.
Similar to standard models with endogenous default, there is a benevolent government that
can borrow from foreign lenders by issuing one-period, non-state contingent bonds, which are
not enforceable and the government transfers the proceeds of debt operations to households.
The government’s incentives to borrow comes from the fact that the government tries to help
households have smooth consumption across time, using these transfers. Foreign lenders
extend loans to the government, taking into account the default risk. Endogenous default
risk is associated with the government’s default or repayment decisions and it depends on
the level of bonds the government would like to issue and the size of the productivity shock.
Default is more likely, if the economy is subject to low TFP shocks and has high levels of
debt because they lead to an increase in the premium that the foreign lenders ask when they
lend to the government. As foreign lenders ask for a higher premium, it becomes harder for
the government to roll over its debt, so it has to incur large taxes on households to finance
the existing debt. If this is the case, then default can become an optimal policy because it
can help eliminate the tax burden and improve households utility. However, the government
faces a trade-off. If the government chooses to default, the government is banned from the
loan markets for a temporary period of time. This means government cannot issue bonds to
help households have smooth consumption during this period.
To generate endogenous drops in output, we assume that firm’s production requires the
finance of working capital loans used to pay a fraction of the wage bill. Adopting the working
capital condition from Neumeyer and Perri (2005) enables us to examine the role of labor in
sovereign defaults. Firms maximize their profits by making labor decisions and taking into
account the interest they need to pay on the working capital loans. They demand less labor
as working capital loans become more expensive due to the increase in sovereign default risk.
The drops in labor demand result in lower production. When the government decides to
default on its debt, the firms can still borrow from foreign lenders, but at a high interest
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rate, even though the government cannot. In this sense, the high interest rate on working
capital loans acts as a default penalty on firms. This assumption is consistent with the
empirical findings in the literature. Arteta and Hale (2008) show that during sovereign debt
crises, there is a significant decline in foreign credit to private firms. The paper suggests
that the decrease in amount of credit available to private firms can be an important channel
that generates large drops in output observed in defaults.
In addition, we assume that the debtor still has debt arrears following defaults. In a
standard default model such as Arellano (2008), the defaulters start with zero debt when
they again enter into the debt market. However, this assumption does not account for
the debt restructuring in emerging countries. Benjamin and Wright (2009) show that the
creditors lose 44 percent of their lending on average through the renegotiation process after
the default. Partial default makes our model closer to the actual debt restructuring of the
defaulters. It can play a role as another form of penalty on default because the debt arrears
lower the future value of default, and therefore it affects the decision on default.
The model explains the main features of the business cycles observed in the emerging
markets well, such as countercyclical spreads, countercyclical trade balance, and high con-
sumption and output volatility, when calibrated to Argentine data. In addition, the model
can generate reasonable drops in labor and output in defaults. We also obtain procyclical
labor over the business cycles and the labor volatility is similar to Argentine economy. We
obtain a procyclical labor supply because two things change when the economy is hit by an
adverse TFP shock; first, the shock has a direct effect on production and it reduces output
because productivity is lower and firms demand less labor, which is a standard result of an
RBC model. Second, the shock has an indirect effect on production through the increase
in endogenous default risk. Because the government is more likely to default, the interest
rate on the working capital loan is also higher, which makes the production even more costly
for the firms and it dampens firms’ labor demand even more. Equilibrium wages also drop
because they are inversely related with interest rates and positively related with the TFP
shock. Because we assume that households have Greenwood-Hercovitz-Huffman (GHH) type
of preferences, the substitution effect dominates the income effect and the households are
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willing to supply less labor.3 Overall this generates even larger drops in output. When
households’ income drops so much due to the decreases in labor income, the government
would like to borrow even more from foreign lenders, so that households can have smooth
consumption. However, since the shocks are persistent, the foreign lenders adjust their ex-
pectations about the future state of the economy, such that they ask for an even higher
premium on the government bonds. This generates a vicious cycle, in which output, labor,
consumption and wages decrease further and it becomes harder for the government to roll
over its debt. Consequently, the government may choose to default to eliminate the tax
burden necessary to finance the existing debt, especially when the level of existing debt is
already very high.
Our paper is related to the endogenous sovereign default literature that starts with
the seminal paper of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and continues with Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006), Arellano (2008), Pitchford and Wright (2011), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012b) and
Amador and Aguiar (2014), some of which were mentioned above.4 These papers assume
an exogenous output process and penalty in their models. Our paper is closely related to
Mendoza and Yue (2011) in that they consider working capital conditions and endogenous
sovereign default. They also combine the international business cycle model and the sovereign
default model by considering the interaction between households, firms, government and
foreign lenders, as we do in this paper. However, their work is different than ours in many
dimensions. First, in their model the efficiency loss from sovereign default generates an
endogenous output cost because firms should substitute imported inputs into other imported
or domestic inputs, which are imperfect substitutes. However, in our model the default cost
stems from the interest rate on working capital and the debt renegotiation. In addition,
while their model adopts working capital conditions for imported intermediate goods, our
model use working capital conditions for labor demand. Second, on the firms’ side they
assume that firms are excluded from the international debt market when the government
3The advantage of GHH preference specification is that it generates the right comovement between labor
supply and production. GHH specification was introduced by Greenwood et al. (1988) and has been used
in many papers with small open economy models, such as Mendoza (1991), Correia et al. (1995), Neumeyer
and Perri (2005), and many others.
4Also see Panizza et al. (2009), Wright (2011) and Aguiar and Amador (2013) for good reviews of this
literature.
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decides to default. In our model, firms can still access to the international debt markets,
but borrow at a high interest rate. In addition, our paper is related to papers on debt
renegotiation and default such as D’Erasmo (2008), Bi (2008), Benjamin and Wright (2009),
Yue (2010), and Pitchford and Wright (2011). Finally, our paper is related to the literature
that studies the business cycle properties of labor market variables in emerging markets. Li
(2011) explains countercyclical interest rates and procyclical wages in emerging economies
by assuming exogenous default risk. As mentioned above we have endogenous default risk
and working capital conditions in our model that generate fluctuations in labor together
with productivity shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and defines
the recursive equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the calibration, the quantitative analysis of
the model and the simulation results. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 MODEL
In this section, we present a model economy in order to understand the role of labor supply
on sovereign debt default. Basically, our model belongs to the class of models in the standard
framework of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), but richer in the sense that it has households,
firms, foreign lenders and the government. We consider a discrete time, small open economy
inhabited by representative households. Households choose optimal consumption and labor
paths that maximize their lifetime utilities subject to the budget constraint. They receive
transfers from the government, wages for supplying labor and profits from the ownership of
the firms. Firms face stochastic TFP shocks and finance working capital before production
takes place similar to Neumeyer and Perri (2005). There is a benevolent government that
represents the preferences of households and has access to international markets. The gov-
ernment can issue one-period bonds to foreign lenders and distribute the proceeds of the
debt payments to the households. The government can choose to default on its debt at any
time, because contracts are not enforceable. The penalty for default is that the government
is forced to stay in financial autarky for a period of time and the firms need to pay higher
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interest rates on their working capital. In addition, if the government gains access to the
international bond markets, it needs to pay the debt arrears. That is, we allow for partial
default.
2.2.1 Households
We assume that the households have GHH preferences which are used in open economy
models by many international business cycle literatures. The GHH preferences are often
adapted because they improve the performance of the model in terms of the business cycle
statistics. In addition, these preferences remove the wealth effect on labor supply and the
labor supply is determined independently of intertemporal considerations. The functional
form of preference is:
u(c, l) =
(
c− lω
ω
)1−σ − 1
1− σ
where ω > 1 and σ > 0.
The households have different budget constraints that depend on whether the government
is in autarky or not. If the government decides to repay its debt, the household problem is
given as:
max
ct,lt
Et
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lt)
]
subject to ct = wtlt + pit + (Bt − qtBt+1).
If the government is in autarky, the budget constraint becomes ct = wtlt + pit. The optimal
labor supply satisfies that
lω−1t = wt. (2.1)
2.2.2 Firms
Firms choose labor demand that maximizes their profits. Profits are equal to revenues net
of the wage bill and interest payments on working capital loans. Firms have to borrow a
certain fraction of the labor cost in order to complete production.
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When the government decides to repay its debt, the interest rate on working capital, rt,
is equal to the interest rate on the government’s debt.
max
lt
ztk
αl1−αt − wtlt − rtθwtlt
where zt is the TFP shock that is assumed to follow a Markov process with a transition
function f(z′, z). The fraction of the labor cost that needs to be borrowed from foreign
lenders at the interest rate, rt, is denoted by θ.
When the government chooses to default, the firms’ problem is:
max
lt
ztk
αl1−αt − wtlt − rdθwtlt,
where rd is the interest rate on working capital loans in default. It will be specified in detail
in the government’s problem.
In addition, we assume that rd is an upper bound on the interest rate on working capital
even when the government decides to repay its debt and the bond price is close to zero.
From the firm’s problem, the wage should satisfy the following optimality condition
obtained from the firm’s problem:
wt =
 1−α1+θrt ztkαl−αt (Repayment)1−α
1+θrd
ztk
αl−αt (Default).
(2.2)
2.2.3 Government
The government of the economy can trade one period, non-state contingent bonds with
foreign lenders that are risk free and competitive. Unlike standard default models, when the
government defaults, the economy does not face direct output costs, but the government is
in a temporary exclusion from borrowing in the debt markets. When the government gains
access to the debt markets, it needs to pay a fraction of the debt, which is denoted by κ.
In this sense, we allow for only partial default in our model. The government’s goal is to
maximize the households’ expected lifetime utility, given as:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lt)
]
, (2.3)
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where β denotes the discount parameter and β ∈ (0, 1).
The government makes two decisions in this model. The first one is whether to repay or
default on its existing debt. Second, conditional on not defaulting, it chooses the amount of
one-period bonds, B′ to issue or buy. If the government chooses to buy bonds, the price it
needs to pay is given as q(B′, z). The discount bonds, B′, can take positive or negative values.
If it is negative, it means that the government borrows −q(B′, z)B′ amounts of period t goods
and promises to pay B′ units of goods in the next period, if it does not default. Similarly, if
B′ is positive, then it implies that the government saves q(B′, z)B′ amounts of period t goods
and it will receive B′ units of goods in the next period. The bond price function q(B′, z)
depends on the size of the bonds, B′, and TFP shock, z. Government’s incentive to default
and the price functions are both endogenous.
The government’s value of option is the maximum of value of default (vd) or value of
repayment (vc) and it is given as:
V (Bt, zt) = max
c,d
{
vc(Bt, zt), v
d(Bt, zt)
}
.
The value of repayment is represented by
vc(Bt, zt) = max
Bt+1
u(ct, lt) + βEt [V (Bt+1, zt+1)]
subject to ct = ztk
αl1−αt − rtθwtlt +Bt − qt(Bt+1, zt)Bt+1.
If the government chooses to repay its debt, the value function for this choice reflects the
future options for default and staying in contract. The government chooses the optimal
bond contract that maximizes the utility of the households and the discounted future value
of option.
The value of default is given as:
vd(Bt, zt) = u(ct, lt) + βEt
[
(1− φ)vd(Bt, zt+1) + φvc(κBt, zt+1)
]
where ct = ztk
αl1−αt − rdθwtlt
The probability of having access to bond markets in the next period is denoted by φ. The
value of default is equal to the utility of household plus the future expected discounted value
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that entails the value of default weighted by 1 − φ and value of option in the next period
weighted by φ. The value of option has κBt as the state variable because the government
enters into the international debt market with the debt arrears κBt due to debt renegotiation
process.
2.2.4 Foreign Lenders
Foreign creditors can perfectly monitor the state of the economy and have perfect information
about the shock processes. They can borrow loans from international credit markets at a
constant interest rate, r∗ > 0, which is the risk free interest rate in this model. Taking the
bond price function q(Bt+1, zt) as given, they choose loans Bt+1 that maximize their expected
profits pi, given as:
pi(Bt+1, zt) =
 q(Bt+1, zt)Bt+1 −
Bt+1
1+r∗ (if Bt+1 ≥ 0)
1−δ(Bt+1,zt)+δ(Bt+1,zt)qd
1+r∗ Bt+1 − q(Bt+1, zt)Bt+1 (if Bt+1 < 0),
(2.4)
where δ(Bt+1, z) is the probability of default and is determined endogenously. The expected
bond price in default is denoted by qd.
Because we assume that the market for new sovereign debt is completely competitive,
the foreign investors’ expected profit is zero in equilibrium. Hence, we have the bond price
as following:
qt(Bt+1, zt) =
 11+r∗ (if Bt+1 ≥ 0)1−δ(Bt+1,zt)+δ(Bt+1,zt)qd
1+r∗ (if Bt+1 < 0),
(2.5)
where the expected bond price in default, qd, is expressed as the following:5
qd =
κφ
r∗ + φ
That is, the bond price reflects both the default risk and the risk of debt restructuring.
5qd is derived from the following process.
qd =
κφ
1 + r∗
+
1− φ
1 + r∗
[
κφ
1 + r∗
+ · · ·
]
=
κφ
1 + r∗
+
1− φ
1 + r∗
qd =
κφ
r∗ + φ
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Using the bond price function, the interest rate on working capital loans can be written
as:
rt(Bt+1, zt) =
 1qt(Bt+1,zt) − 1 (if rt < rd)rd (otherwise). (2.6)
When the government saves (Bt+1 > 0) or does not default on it debt, the interest rate on
working capital loans is a function of the bond price. However, if the government decides
to default on its debt, then the interest rate is the maximum level in the economy, which is
exogenously set in the model.
2.2.5 Recursive Equilibrium
We focus on a recursive equilibrium, where there is no enforcement. Based on the foreign
creditors’ problem, government’s debt demand is met as long as the gross return on the bond
equals to the risk free rate, 1 + r.
We can characterize the government’s default policy by default and repayment sets. Let
A(B) be the set of z for which repayment is optimal when assets are B, such that
A(B) =
{
z ∈ Z : vc(B, z) ≥ vd(B, z)} , (2.7)
and let D(B) = A˜(B) be the set of z for which default is optimal for a level of assets B:
D(B) =
{
z ∈ Z : vc(B, z) < vd(B, z)} . (2.8)
Also, let s = {B, z} be the set of aggregate states for the economy.
Definition 1. The recursive equilibrium for this economy is defined as a set of policy func-
tions for (i) consumption c(s); (ii) government’s asset holdings B′(s), repayment sets A(B),
and default sets D(B); (iii) the wage function w(B′, z); and (iv) the price function for bonds
q(B′, z) such that:
1. Households’ consumption c(s) satisfies the resource constraints, taking the government
policies as given.
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2. The government’s policy functions B′(s), repayment sets A(B), and default sets D(B)
satisfy the government optimization problem, taking the bond price function q(B′, z) as
given.
3. The optimal wage function w(B′, z) satisfies firms’ optimization problem, taking the in-
terest rate on working capital loans r(B′, z) as given.
4. Bonds prices q(B′, z) reflect the government’s default probabilities and default probabili-
ties satisfy creditors’ expected zero profits.
5. Labor market clears.
At the equilibrium, the bond price function should satisfy both the government’s opti-
mization problem and the expected zero profits in the lenders’ problem, so that probability
of default endogenously affects the bond price. Using the default sets, we can express the
probability of default such that:
δ(B′, z) =
∫
D(B′)
f(z′, z)dz′.
2.3 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
We solve the model numerically. In this section, we describe the estimation procedure for
the shock processes. We calibrate the model to analyze the debt dynamics quantitatively,
using Argentine data between 1990-2002.
2.3.1 Data
First, we begin with documenting the business cycle characteristics of the Argentine economy.
For the business cycle statistics we use real output, consumption and trade balance data in
quarterly, seasonally adjusted, real series covering the period 1993Q1 and 2001Q4 from the
dataset in Arellano (2008).6 We take logs of GDP and consumption series and detrend these
series using an HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600. The trade balance data are
reported as a fraction of GDP. We also borrow the spread data from Arellano (2008), which
6Arellano (2008) uses the data provided by the Ministry of Finance of Argentina.
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Table 2.1: Business cycle statistics for Argentina from 1993Q1 to 2001Q4
std(x) corr(x, y) corr(x, rc)
Interest rates spread 3.08 −0.74 −
Trade balance 1.75 −0.58 0.70
Consumption 3.75 0.97 −0.68
Output 3.33 − −0.74
Wage 4.18 0.49 −0.34
Labor∗ 3.69 0.58 −0.85
Other Statistics in default in 2002
Output drop 12.01
Consumption drop 12.86
Wage drop 13.88
Labor drop 18.46
Default probability 2.78
* Quarterly labor data are available only between 1997Q1 and 2001Q4
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are defined as the difference between the interest rate in Argentina and the yield of the
five-year US Treasury bond. The interest rate series is EMBI for Argentina and start from
1983Q3. The quarterly wage series are available in International Financial Statistics (IFS)
and Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC). We take logs and detrend the
series using an HP filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 1600. For the labor data, we
use the weekly hours of work from INDEC. However, these are only available starting from
1997. Hence, we use a short time series for labor.
Table 2.1 presents the business cycle statistics of all the data available up to the default
episode that started in December 26, 2001. The first column shows the standard deviations
up to the default episode. We find that consumption, wage, and labor are more volatile
than output. The second and the third column present the correlations of each variable
with the output and the interest rate spread, respectively. It has been shown that emerging
market economies are characterized by countercyclical spread rates and net exports. Also,
their consumption is highly correlated with output. We see similar empirical results for
Argentina in the second column. In addition, we see that labor and wage are procyclical
with output. The interest rate spread is negatively correlated with consumption and output,
and positively correlated with trade balance. Wages and the labor are negatively correlated
with the spread rate.
2.3.2 Calibration
The model is solved quantitatively. In the numerical solution, we define one period as a
quarter. Our calibration strategy is largely based on Argentine data. Table 2.2 shows the
calibrated parameter values.
The utility function represents GHH preferences as we explained in section 2.1. The risk
aversion parameter, σ, is set to two, the risk-free interest rate is set to one percent, and
the capital share to 0.32 percent, which are standard values in macroeconomics literature.
The curvature parameter of labor in GHH preference is set to 1.455 which determines Frisch
wage elasticity by 1
ω−1 = 2.2. The debt recovery rate κ is set to 0.27 following Benjamin and
Wright (2009). Benjamin and Wright (2009) estimate the recovery rate for all the default
18
Table 2.2: Parameters
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r∗ = 0.010 Standard RBC value
Risk aversion σ = 2.000 Standard RBC value
Capital share α = 0.320 Mendoza (1991)
Curvature parameter of labor supply ω = 1.455 Frisch wage elasticity=2.2
Debt recovery rate κ = 0.270 Benjamin and Wright (2009)
Calibration Values Target statistics
Autocorrelation of TFP shocks ρz = 0.952 GDP autocorrelation = 0.860
Standard deviation of TFP shocks σz = 0.017 GDP std. deviation = 0.033
Discount factor β = 0.877 Default probability = 2.78%
Interest rate on working capital in default rd = 0.350 Wage drop in default = 13.88%
Probability of reentry φ = 0.150 Trade Balance Volatility = 1.75
Fraction of working capital θ = 0.145 Output drop in default = 12.01%
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episodes in recorded history. For Argentina’s default in 2001, they estimate it as 27 percent.
For the TFP shock process, we assume that it follows an AR(1) process:
log zt = ρz log zt−1 + t
with  ∼ N(0, σ2z). We use the quadrature method in Tauchen (1986) to construct a Markov
approximation with 21 realizations. Data for labor is not available for 1993Q1 to 1996Q4,
so we set ρz and σz to target the standard deviation and first-order autocorrelation of quar-
terly HP filtered GDP data of Argentina. We use seasonally-adjusted quarterly real GDP
data from Arellano (2008) for the period 1980Q1 to 2005Q4. The standard deviation and
autocorrelation of the cyclical component of GDP are 3.3 percent and 0.86, respectively. To
match these targets, we set ρz = 0.952 and σz = 0.017.
The discount parameter β, the working capital interest rate in default rd, the probability
of reentry into international debt market, φ, and the fraction of working capital, θ, target
default probability, wage drop in default, output drop in default, and trade balance volatility.
We use SMM method to match these targets and the parameters are calibrated, such that
β = 0.877, rd = 0.35, φ = 0.150, and θ = 0.145.
2.4 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we begin with the analysis of the benchmark model’s results and we also
elaborate on the intuition on the workings of the model. To solve the model numerically,
we use the discrete state-space method. We discretize the asset space, making sure that the
minimum and the maximum points on the grid do not bind when we compute the optimal
debt decision. Our solution algorithm for the benchmark model is given in the appendix
A.1.
Figure 2.2 shows the default risk and the bond price schedule generated by the model. As
the model suggests the more the government borrows, the higher the default risk becomes.
In addition, default risk increases as the economy is hit by low TFP shocks. Similar to
the results presented in standard default literature, such as Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and
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Figure 2.2: Default risk and bond prices
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Figure 2.3: Interest rate on working capital and labor supply
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Figure 2.4: Savings and value functions
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Gopinath (2006), we observe that the bond price is an increasing function of the assets, such
that high levels of debt entails a low bond price. The bond price schedule is determined by
not only the default risk, but also the risk of debt restructuring and the expected bond price
in default qd, which is constant regardless of the size of the TFP shock. Even though the
government is not able to borrow in default, its debt arrears are evaluated at the bond price
in default, qd. In addition, the bond price is an increasing function in TFP shock. That is,
the economy with high TFP shock pays less interest on its debt than the one subject to low
TFP shock.
The first panel in Figure 2.3 shows the interest rates on working capital loans generated
by the model. The interest rate is calculated using (2.6). Unlike the standard sovereign
default models, the interest rate on working capital has an upper bound of rd and it is
the level that the firms need to pay for borrowing working capital, when the sovereign
declares default. The interest rate on working capital is a decreasing function in government
assets and TFP shocks. Firms in the economy with high TFP shock and low debt pay less
interest on working capital compared to those in the economy with low TFP shock and
high debt. On the second panel in Figure 2.3, we show that the labor supply increases as
the government assets increase and the state of the world gets better. Intuitively, wages
increase in expansions, so households are willing to supply more labor. Also, firms face lower
interest rates on working capital loans, which reduces labor costs, therefore in equilibrium
they demand more labor during expansions.
The first panel in Figure 2.4 shows the saving policy function conditional on not default-
ing, which is similar with the standard default model. Our results show that the government
borrows more in expansions and is less likely to default in good states of the world. This
result is consistent with countercyclical interest rates, since it becomes more costly to borrow
in bad states of the world. The second panel of Figure 2.4 is the value of option as a function
of assets. The small kink shows the level of assets above which repayment is optimal.
Next, we move on to the business cycle statistics generated by the benchmark model and
we evaluate the performance of the model with Argentine data. The simulation results for
the benchmark model are presented in Table 2.3. The benchmark model generates a default
probability of 0.03 percent, which is relatively smaller than the data (3 percent). In our
24
Table 2.3: Statistical moments in the benchmark model and in the data
(1) (2) (3)
Statistics Data Model Model (θ = 0)
Average debt/GDP ratio (%) 33.20 30.60 -
Average bond spreads (%) 6.60 0.02 0.00
Std. dev. of bond spreads (%) 3.08 0.03 7.36
Std. dev. of labor (%) 3.69 5.96 -
Std. dev. of consumption / Std. dev. of GDP 1.13 1.01 0.97
Std. dev. of labor / Std. dev. of GDP 0.86 0.69 0.68
Correlations with GDP
Bond spreads -0.74 -0.25 -
Trade balance -0.58 -0.22 0.99
Labor 0.58 1.00 1.00
Correlations with bond spreads
Trade balance 0.70 0.02 -
Labor -0.85 -0.25 -
Other statistics in default
Output drop (%) 12.01 20.12 -
Consumption drop (%) 12.86 23.03 -
Wage drop (%) 13.88 7.79 -
Labor drop (%) 18.46 17.12 -
Default probability (%) 2.78 0.02 -
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model, we don’t have ad-hoc default penalty as other literatures on sovereign default. Even
without this type of output penalty, the simulation results from our model are fairly similar
to the business cycle statistics in Argentina. The model also generates large drops in output
and wage during default episodes as in the data. The model can also generate high volatility
in labor supply.
In terms of correlations with output, consumption shows a positive correlation and the
interest rate spread shows a negative correlation consistent with the data. Moreover, there
is a negative correlation between output and trade balance. The reason is that households
can consume more than their income from wages and profits during expansions, because the
government can borrow easily. On the other hand, when there is a recession, borrowing is
constrained, therefore the consumption is less than the income from wages and profits of the
firms. This generates a countercyclical trade balance over the business cycle. Correlations
with interest rate show consistent results with the data.
Our model also performs well in terms of generating a procyclical labor supply. We
obtain a procyclical labor supply because two things change when the economy is hit by an
adverse TFP shock; first, the shock has a direct effect on production and it reduces output
because productivity is lower and firms demand less labor, which is a standard result of an
RBC model. Second, the shock has an indirect effect on production through the increase
in endogenous default risk. Because the government is more likely to default, the interest
rate on the working capital loan is also higher, which makes production even more costly
for the firms and it dampens firms’ labor demand even more. Equilibrium wages also drop
because they are inversely related to interest rates and positively related to the TFP shock.
Because of the GHH preferences, the substitution effect dominates the income effect and
the households are wiling to supply less labor. Overall this generates even larger drops in
output. When households’ income drops so much due to the decreases in labor income, the
government would like to borrow even more from foreign lenders so that households can have
smooth consumption. However, since the shocks are persistent, the foreign lenders adjust
their expectations about the future state of the economy, such that they ask for an even
higher premium on the government bonds. This generates a vicious cycle, in which output,
labor, consumption and wages decrease further and it becomes harder for the government to
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roll over its debt. Thus, the government may choose to default to eliminate the tax burden
necessary to finance the existing debt, especially when the level of existing debt is already
very high.
To look at the role of the working capital condition, we set θ equal to zero. We find that
this model generates no default. In addition, consumption becomes less volatile than output
and the trade balance becomes procyclical. The results show that the financing of working
capital plays an important role in generating the default risk.
2.5 CONCLUSION
This paper studies the relationship between endogenous default risk and labor decisions us-
ing a stochastic general equilibrium model in a small open economy. With the assumptions
on working capital loans and the debt renegotiation in default, our model performs well in
matching the business cycle characteristics of the Argentine economy. We obtain counter-
cyclical interest rates and procyclical labor. An increase in default risk yields a lower bond
price and it implies a high interest rate on working capital loans. As the cost of production
increases, firm’s labor demand decreases. Since equilibrium wages also drop and the substi-
tution effect dominates the income effect, the households are willing to supply less labor. In
equilibrium we find that both production and labor are lower, when the economy is hit by
an adverse TFP shock. The reduction in labor income and output induces the government
to want to borrow more from foreign lenders; however, the lenders ask for higher premiums
due to endogenous default risk. This makes borrowing even harder for the government and
the government may choose to default to eliminate the tax burden necessary to finance the
existing debt.
Sovereign defaults are related to a number of factors domestically as well as internation-
ally. Unlike the earlier papers in the literature, in this paper we focus on the labor supply
and demand decisions as channels that induce default. We show that working capital con-
ditions can be a channel for amplifying the effects of adverse TFP shocks on labor supply
and demand decisions and it can increase the default risk. We see this paper as a first step
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to look into the how labor supply and demand decisions are linked with sovereign default
risk. However, we believe that one might get even stronger amplification effects by intro-
ducing other labor market frictions, such as matching frictions similar to the ones used in
Mortensen-Pissarides type of models. We leave this for future study.
28
3.0 INCOME INEQUALITY AND SOVEREIGN DEFAULT1
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Emerging markets tend to experience high rates of sovereign default and they are also char-
acterized by high income inequality that changes over time. In sovereign default literature,
the line of research following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) has focused mainly on the effects
of output shocks on the government’s borrowing and default decisions. In this paper, we
study the role of income inequality in government’s borrowing and default decisions. Does
higher income inequality increase the probability of default? Furthermore, how do changes
in inequality compare to changes in output in explaining the variation in default probability?
Figure 3.1 presents empirical evidence that shows the relationship between income in-
equality and the sovereign bond ratings. We estimate the partial regressions, controlling for
external debt-to-GDP ratio, income per capita, country and time fixed effects, using a panel
dataset that covers 23 emerging economies from 1994-2012.2 The figure shows the scatter
plots and the negative relationship between income inequality measured by the Gini index
and the creditworthiness of countries’ bond ratings, which proxy the default risk.3 The
results suggest that there is a positive correlation between income inequality and default
risk.
In order to explore the relationship between endogenous default risk and income inequal-
ity, we consider a stochastic general equilibrium model following an approach similar to that
1This research is a joint work with Zeynep Kabukcuoglu.
2Following the empirical papers that study the determinants of a country’s default risk, we also use ratings
grade data and total external debt scaled by GDP in this analysis. See Cantor and Packer (1996), Reinhart
(2002) and Reinhart et al. (2003).
3Reinhart et al. (2003) show that sovereign bond ratings are good predictors of default.
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Figure 3.1: Partial Regression Plots E(ratings|X) vs E(Gini|X)
of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). We model a small open economy with two types of house-
holds. In addition to output shocks that affect the average level of endowment, we introduce
shocks that affect its distribution, which we call inequality shocks.4 The economy is sub-
ject to aggregate uncertainty about future endowments, and households cannot completely
insure against the shocks. The output and inequality shocks have different effects on the
endowments; an adverse output shock lowers the endowments of both types, but an adverse
inequality shock raises the endowment of the rich households and reduces the endowment
of the poor households, increasing the dispersion between the endowments. There is also
a benevolent government that represents the preferences of the households and can issue
non-state contingent, one-period bond contracts to borrow from risk-neutral foreign lenders,
retaining the option to default at any time. We assume that default entails exogenous drops
in output and that the economy goes into autarky temporarily. The government internal-
4Even though our model treats the changes in income inequality as exogenous, these shocks can be
motivated by the fact that idiosyncratic labor earnings risk exhibits countercyclical volatility, as shown by
Storesletten et al. (2004).
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izes how its borrowing decisions affect the default risk, as well as the price of bonds, which
determines the interest rates.
In our model, the government would like to borrow on behalf of households for two rea-
sons. First, the government uses bond contracts and rebates the proceeds of debt operations
equally across households to help them smooth consumption. Second, the equilibrium inter-
est rate is lower than the discount rate of the government, so the government would like to
shift future consumption to today by borrowing. The level of existing debt and the size of the
shocks are crucial for government’s borrowing decision. As the debt accumulates, it becomes
harder to roll over because the benefits of borrowing diminish. Defaults are particularly more
attractive in recessions, in high inequality states and when there is high debt accumulation
because foreign lenders offer bond contracts that have higher interest rates in those states,
which creates a borrowing constraint for the government. The government’s goal is to maxi-
mize household’s expected lifetime utilities, so it achieves this goal by trying to equalize the
marginal utilities of consumption between households and across time. Default can reduce
the gap in the marginal utilities of consumption between the two types of households because
the burden of debt payment can be eliminated. Consequently, in our model, default can serve
as a redistribution mechanism that improves households’ welfare. The main finding of this
paper is that inequality shocks can increase the default risk significantly. The key intuition
for this result is that when the economy is subject to both adverse inequality and output
shocks, the marginal utility of consumption of the poor increases significantly relative to the
marginal utility of consumption of the rich. This generates a large tax burden, particularly
on poor households, and the government chooses to default more often to wipe out the debt
burden.
When we consider the role of each shock, we find that default risk is slightly higher
when there are output shocks than inequality shocks. This is because the implied default
penalties are different in the two models. In the case of output shocks, the default penalty
is higher in good states of the world and smaller otherwise. So with smaller penalty and
tighter borrowing constraints in bad states, we observe a larger default rate. On the other
hand, in case of inequality shocks the default penalty is constant across all states because
aggregate output is constant. This generates a lower probability of default in this model.
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However, each shock alone can generate only about one sixth of the probability of default
observed when there are both shocks in the model. Thus, we show that the joint effect of
these shocks helps the model generate a default probability consistent with the data. The
reason behind this result is the VAR(1) process estimated from the Argentine data. Based
on the estimates of the structural parameters, we find that high inequality at time t − 1
leads to lower output at time t. Also, the estimates of the covariances of the shocks are
negative, which implies that there is more likely to be an adverse output shock together with
an adverse inequality shock. These characteristics play an important role in lenders’ and
the government’s expectations about the future state of the economy. An adverse inequality
shock not only amplifies the effect of a low output shock today, but also creates a deep-
seated pessimism that the recession will be more severe in the future. As a result, foreign
lenders ask for a higher premium even for smaller levels of debt. This increases the borrowing
constraints for the government, and default becomes the optimal decision.
The model is calibrated using Argentine data between 1990-2002, and we simulate the
model to generate the business cycle statistics. Our model’s results regarding the default
probabilities can be compared to the results in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).5 Similar to
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), the default probability when the economy is hit by an output
shock is quite low, only 0.52 percent. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) also use shocks to the
trend of output and generate a default probability of around two percent. On the other hand,
the inequality shocks generate a default probability of 0.32 percent. Using shocks to both
output and inequality, our model can match countercyclical interest rates, high volatility of
consumption and output, and a positive correlation between the trade balance and interest
rate spreads. In addition to that, inequality is countercyclical with output and positively
correlated with interest rate spreads.
We also calibrate the model to match the business cycle statistics of Mexico. We find
that the model can explain the business cycle statistics observed in Mexico well. In addition,
it can also generate high consumption volatility of the poor households relative to the rich
households. We find that the ratio of the volatilities is close to its data counterpart. Incom-
5Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) assume a representative agent model; yet their default penalty structure
and calibration strategy are similar to ours.
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plete asset markets together with output and inequality shocks are key for this result. In
the model, income inequality shocks amplify the effect of output shocks particularly on the
poor households’ endowment. Since there are no other assets that the households can use to
insure against these shocks, poor households have higher volatility of consumption than the
rich households. This is an important contribution of the paper that has not been shown by
the existing papers in the literature before.
As a policy implication, we extend the model by introducing progressive income taxes
and analyze the effect of these taxes on the debt levels and the default probability. When it
is costly to borrow for the government, i.e. the proceeds of the debt operations are negative,
the government finances the existing debt by issuing progressive income taxes. We adopt the
progressive tax regime that Heathcote et al. (2014) present. However, when it is cheap to
borrow, the government does not tax households, it simply distributes the transfers across
households. We show that as the progressivity of the tax increases, the probability of default
decreases. The tax system helps eliminate the effect of inequality shocks in the model
and reduces the dispersion in the marginal utilities of consumption between households.
Therefore, we obtain larger debt in the simulated economies.
This paper relates to the recent quantitative models that explore emerging markets’
business cycles and sovereign debt. We contribute to the sovereign default literature by
incorporating the role of income inequality as an additional source of default risk. The en-
dogenous sovereign default literature starts with the seminal paper of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and continues with Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), Martin and Ven-
tura (2010), Yue (2010), Pitchford and Wright (2011), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012a),
Amador and Aguiar (2014) and Gennaioli et al. (2014), some of which were mentioned
above.6 Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), and Chat-
terjee and Eyigungor (2012b) consider long maturity bonds in a representative agent frame-
work. Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) and Hatchondo et al. (2009) study the role of political
uncertainties in sovereign default risk. Martin and Ventura (2010) and Broner et al. (2008)
show that well-functioning secondary markets can eliminate the default risk. All these pa-
6Also see Panizza et al. (2009), Wright (2011) and Aguiar and Amador (2013) for good reviews of this
literature.
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pers use representative agent models and focus on the role of output shocks. Our paper is
also closely related to D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2012) and D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2013),
the main focus of which is the relationship between wealth inequality and default using a
heterogeneous agent framework. D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2012) have endogenous wealth
heterogeneity that comes from idiosyncratic income shocks; however, the amount of bonds
is determined by a fiscal reaction function and does not come from the maximization of
household utility. As mentioned above, in our model, the government optimally chooses the
level of next-period bonds taking into account the welfare of the households. Furthermore,
we show that income inequality shocks tend to have a systematic relationship with output
shocks, so we incorporate this dimension into our model to generate inequality. D’Erasmo
and Mendoza (2013) study the distributional effects of sovereign debt default in a two-period,
closed economy model, assuming an exogenous initial wealth distribution. In their closed
economy setup, they study optimal debt and default decisions on domestic debt. However, in
our model, we focus on borrowing and default on external debt in a small open economy. In
this sense, our paper is complementary to these two papers. Cuadra et al. (2010) study fiscal
policy and default risk using a representative agent model, in which tax on consumption is
endogenously determined and the revenues are used to finance public goods. In our paper,
we assume progressive taxes on income.
Our paper is also related to the immense empirical literature that studies the determi-
nants of sovereign default. Cantor and Packer (1996) show that income, external debt and
economic development are significant determinants of credit risk. Reinhart et al. (2003)
show that a country’s past behavior about meeting its debt obligations can be a good pre-
dictor of its ability to pay future debt, pointing out the importance of financial institutions.
Hatchondo et al. (2007) argue that countries are more likely to default during periods with
low resources, high borrowing costs and changes in political circumstances, and Gonza´lez-
Rozada and Yeyati (2008) examine the role of global factors, such as liquidity, risk appetite
and contagion, in explaining the emerging market spreads.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We provide a more formal analysis of the
empirical results, showing the relationship between income inequality and credit scores in
Section 2. We then present the model and define the recursive equilibrium in Section 3.
34
We discuss the calibration, the quantitative analysis of the model and the simulation results
with counter factual experiments in Section 4. Section 5 presents the business cycle statistics
obtained for Mexico and discusses the differences in consumption volatilities between rich
and poor households. Section 6 shows the effects of income taxes. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 EMPIRICAL MOTIVATION
In this section, we provide empirical results that support the relationship between income
inequality and default risk. We use credit ratings dataset as a measure of default risk.
Reinhart (2002) shows that credit ratings can predict defaults well.7 First, we show that
income inequality is positively correlated with the creditworthiness of sovereign bonds. Next,
we provide evidence on the fact that income inequality is countercyclical over the business
cycle.
3.2.1 Income Inequality and Credit Ratings
Reinhart et al. (2003) show that there is a strong relationship between external debt and
credit ratings. In order to present some empirical evidence for the effect of inequality on the
creditworthiness of sovereign bonds, we follow an approach similar to that in Reinhart et
al. (2003). We use the following specification to estimate the effect of inequality on credit
scores:
Credit Scorei,t = α0 + α1Ginii,t−1 + α2Debt-to-GDPi,t−1 (3.1)
+ α3GDP per capitai,t−1 + ui + zt + errori,t
To measure the creditworthiness of sovereign bonds, we use the Fitch credit ratings data for
long-term bonds that are issued under foreign currency. This dataset covers a period between
1994 and 2012. For income inequality, we use the Gini indices provided by the Standardized
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2009). This is an unbalanced panel
7They show that this relationship is robust using various credit-score datasets such as Institutional In-
vestor ratings, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.
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dataset that has information on inequality for 153 countries covering 1960 to 2012. Debt-to-
GDP ratio is the external debt-to-GDP ratio from the Reinhart-Rogoff series that extends
until 2010. Most of this dataset comes from IMF’s Standard Data Dissemination Service,
and it is defined as the outstanding amount of those actual current liabilities that require
payments of principal and/or interest that residents of an economy owe to non-residents
(Statistics, 2003). The GDP per capita series is from the World Bank, and we take its
log for this estimation. The Net foreign assets-to-GDP (NFA/GDP) data used in Table
3.1 are from the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). This series includes net foreign assets (NFA) using FDI or equity assets and liabilities
estimated using different methodologies. NFA is defined as the sum of the net debt position,
the net equity position and the net FDI position in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). In order
to perform a regression using the credit ratings, we assign a numerical value similar to that
in Cantor and Packer (1996) and Reinhart (2002). Table B1 shows the conversion of the
ratings to scores in Appendix B.1.
We expect to obtain a negative coefficient on Gini and debt-to-GDP ratio and a positive
coefficient on GDP per capita. This implies that higher inequality in country i at time t− 1
reduces the credit score in the next period. The credit score of a country shows how risky
that country’s bond is, and higher inequality increases the riskiness, which is reflected by a
lower credit score.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the variables used for the regression sample,
which covers the period 1994-2010 and contains 45 countries. A couple of differences stand
out when we compare observations of emerging markets and advanced economies. First,
emerging markets have low ratings even though their debt-to-GDP ratios are not very high.
When the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP is considered, emerging markets are, on average,
more indebted than advanced countries. Second, they also have higher income inequality
and lower GDP per capita than advanced economies have.
We estimate equation 3.1 using year (zt) and country (ui) fixed effects. We are interested
in analyzing the effect of inequality that varies over time; therefore, country fixed effects will
control for time-invariant characteristics unique to a country. In the first specification, we
find that an increase in a country’s external debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with lower
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Table 3.1: Country ratings, debt, income inequality, GDP per capita and net foreign
assets
Country Average Average external Average Average Average
Fitch Rating debt/GDP Inequality GDP per capita NFA/GDP
Emerging market economies
Argentina CCC-/CCC 72.49 45.19 4,483 -21.82
Bolivia CCC+/B- 55.64 50.16 1,086 -64.71
Brazil B+/BB- 28.82 50.22 4,739 -32.47
Bulgaria BB-/BB 85.21 28.38 3,613 -53.71
Chile BBB+/A- 47.71 49.34 7,131 -30.29
China BBB+/A- 12.99 48.27 1,573 8.65
Colombia BB/BB+ 30.64 50.38 3,386 -25.00
Costa Rica BB- 29.18 44.08 4,680 -21.82
Dominican Rep. CCC+ 26.71 45.80 3,928 -35.65
Ecuador CCC-/CCC 49.55 50.02 3,005 -49.82
Egypt, Arab Rep. BB/BB+ 33.13 35.43 1,220 -11.76
El Salvador BB-/BB 40.51 45.47 2,698 -38.53
Ghana B-/B 75.86 40.01 504 -53.53
India BB/BB+ 19.45 49.57 762 -19.71
Indonesia B/B+ 65.47 55.45 1,283 -60.76
Korea, Rep. BBB+/A- 31.30 31.60 16,643 -12.94
Malaysia BBB-/BBB 46.50 47.61 5,296 -21.18
Mexico BB/BB+ 30.22 47.03 7,586 -34.94
Nigeria B+ 18.33 42.46 920 -57.76
Panama BB/BB+ 56.91 49.64 4,747 -77.94
Peru BB-/BB 40.70 50.92 3,038 -41.59
Philippines BB-/BB 62.05 50.79 1,195 -42.29
Romania BB- 38.69 30.06 4,447 -28.47
Russia BB 43.34 30.31 4,928 1.24
Sri Lanka CCC+/B- 44.52 41.16 1388 -45.24
Thailand BB+/BBB- 46.69 52.70 2,623 -39.59
Turkey B/B+ 43.44 45.29 6,584 -35.29
Uruguay B+/BB- 43.91 43.18 5,447 -11.53
Venezuela B/B+ 35.65 41.59 5,500 5.71
Advanced economies
Australia AA-/AA 59.96 31.32 30,7901 -54.47
Canada AA/AA+ 69.65 30.18 30,870 -18.47
Denmark AA/AA+ 96.08 22.40 43,164 -12.53
Finland AA-/AA 72.71 22.35 29,175 -46.24
Greece BBB/BBB+ 93.64 33.64 19,689 -53.94
Hungary BBB-/BBB 85.08 28.36 9,881 -81.76
Italy A+/AA- 84.03 33.60 29,355 -17.53
Japan AA-/AA 33.66 28.38 34,743 33.94
New Zealand AA-/AA 84.00 32.38 27,242 -84.35
Norway AA+ 44.65 23.41 57,064 38.59
Poland BB/BB+ 41.43 30.01 6,960 -39.41
Portugal A-/A 138.62 35.05 17,497 -59.29
Singapore AA/AA+ 154.52 42.92 25,595 1.78
Spain AA/AA+ 90.52 32.88 23,920 -47.76
Sweden AA- 92.11 23.39 34,421 -25.41
United States AA+ 60.68 36.80 41,165 -14.76
List of countries used in the panel regression. Time period covers 1994-2010. Data
sources from left to right: Fitch, Rainhart-Rogoff series, SWIID, the World Bank and
the External Wealth of Nations Mark II database.
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creditworthiness in the next period. This is a standard result in the literature, as well. In
the second specification, we introduce GDP per capita in log terms, and we find that an
increase in income is associated with an increase in country’s creditworthiness. Finally, the
last specification shows the relationship between income inequality and credit ratings. We
find that an increase in Gini index is negatively associated with the creditworthiness in the
next period. The estimate is significant at ten percent and robust to country and time fixed
effects. In order to get an economic interpretation of the estimates, we do a simple back-of-
the-envelope calculation based on the third specification. The median score in the sample
is 13, which corresponds to BB+. We estimate the third specification separately for each
country. Then, we increase each variable by its one standard deviation and compare their
effects on the score for each country. We find that, on average, a one standard deviation
increase in external debt reduces the credit score by 0.97 and a one standard deviation
increase in log GDP increases the credit score by only 0.01 point. On the other hand, a
one standard deviation increase in Gini reduces the credit score by 0.21 point. The largest
effect comes from the external debt-to-GDP, but the change in the Gini index also has a
substantial effect.
The regression results are also robust to the use of the Gini series obtained from The
World Bank. The regression sample constructed using this series has 40 countries and
covers the period 1994-2009. This sample has similar statistics for the median and standard
deviation of debt and GDP per capita data. The median inequality in this sample is 40.8, and
it has a larger standard deviation of 5.57. The estimation is again done with the inclusion
of country and time fixed effects. The results are reported in Table B2 in the Appendix B.1.
Using the same specification, we find that the estimate for inequality is larger and significant
at five percent. However, external debt-to-GDP loses its significance when GDP per capita
and the Gini index are included in the specification.
3.2.2 Income Inequality over the Business Cycle
In order to support our theory that income inequality plays a role in default decisions, we
also need to determine whether there is countercyclical inequality over the business cycle.
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Table 3.2: Panel regressions explaining creditworthiness with debt ratios,
GDP per capita and inequality
Dependent Variable: Score of country i in year t.
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
External debt-to-GDP at t− 1 −0.0221∗∗∗ −0.0146∗∗∗ −0.0122∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0048)
GDP per capita at t− 1 − 9.5976∗∗∗ 10.0130∗∗∗
(2.5606) (2.5013)
Gini at t− 1 −0.0698∗
(0.0360)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No of countries 45 45 45
N 568 568 568
Sample period is between 1994 and 2010. The dependent variable is the
credit score of country i in year t. Estimation is by robust standard errors.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP is in logs.
(***,**,* represent significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.)
Using household-level data from several countries, Krueger et al. (2010) show that during
recessions, earnings inequality increases.8 We perform a similar exercise using our country-
level data. We use the countries that have continuous series for Gini and GDP, leaving
us with 77 countries. We compute the correlation between detrended GDP and inequality
and find that, on average, inequality is countercyclical over the business cycle, with a mean
correlation equal to −0.02. This result is robust to using the Gini series from The World
Bank, as well. In this sample, there are only 46 countries and the mean correlation is equal
to −0.03. Both results support the idea inequality is, on average, countercyclical over the
business cycle in our sample.
8They have several inequality measures, such as Gini coefficient, variance of logs, 50/10 and 90/50 per-
centile ratios, and the countries they study are Canada, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Russia, Spain, Sweden and
the USA.
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3.3 MODEL
In this section, we present a model economy in order to structurally analyze the role of in-
equality in sovereign debt default. Our model is similar to the model presented by Arellano
(2008) and belongs to the class of models in the standard framework of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981). We consider a discrete time, small open economy inhabited by heterogeneous agents
that are hand-to-mouth and differ in the stochastic endowments they receive. The endow-
ment is subject to aggregate output and inequality shocks that cannot be completely insured
against. There is a benevolent government that represents the preferences of households and
has access to international markets. The government can issue one-period bonds to foreign
lenders and rebate the proceeds of the debt operations to the households. The government
can choose to default fully on its debt at any time, because contracts are not enforceable.
The penalty for default is that the economy is forced into financial autarky for a period of
time, and there is an exogenous drop in output. Now, we move on to the details of the
model.
3.3.1 Households
There are two types of infinitely-lived households indexed by i = 1, 2, and their preferences
over consumption of the good, ct, is assumed to be
u(cit) =
ci,1−σt
1− σ (3.2)
where σ is the constant relative risk-aversion parameter, and σ > 0 and σ 6= 1. The type 1
household receives a stochastic stream of a tradable good, (1+γ)y
2
, and type 2 receives (1−γ)y
2
,
where y and γ denote output and inequality, respectively. The output y and the inequality
γ follow a Markov process with a transition function f (y′, γ′|y, γ). Households also receive
an equal amount of transfer from (or pay taxes on goods to) the benevolent government in
a lump sum fashion. Households live hand-to-mouth, which means they do not make any
individual saving or borrowing decisions.
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3.3.2 Government
The government of the economy can trade one-period, non-state contingent bonds with
foreign lenders that are risk neutral and competitive. As in a standard default model,
when the government defaults, the economy faces two types of exogenous default penalties:
direct output costs and a temporary exclusion from borrowing in the debt markets. The
government’s goal is to maximize social utility, which is the expected discounted sum of
lifetime utilities of both types with equal weights given as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(c1t ) + u(c
2
t )
]
, (3.3)
where β denotes the discount parameter and β ∈ (0, 1). The government makes two decisions
in this model. First, it decides whether to repay or default on its existing debt. Second,
conditional on not defaulting, it chooses the amount of one-period bonds, B′, to issue or buy.
If the government chooses to buy bonds, the price it needs to pay is given as q(B′, y, γ). The
discount bonds, B′, can take a positive or negative value. If it is negative, this means that
the government borrows −q(B′, y, γ)B′ amounts of period t goods and promises to pay B′
units of goods in the next period, if it does not default. Similarly, if B′ is positive, then this
implies that the government saves q(B′, y, γ)B′ amounts of period t goods and will receive
B′ units of goods in the next period. The bond price function q(B′, y, γ) depends on the size
of the bonds, B′, income shock, y, and inequality shock, q. Government internalizes how its
borrowing decisions affect the default risk and the price of the bond.
When the government chooses to repay its debt, the resource constraint for household 1
is
c1 =
(1 + γ)y
2
+
B − q(B′, y, γ)B′
2
, (3.4)
and the resource constraint for household 2 is
c2 =
(1− γ)y
2
+
B − q(B′, y, γ)B′
2
. (3.5)
The economy faces three types of uncertainty that cannot be insured away with non-state-
contingent bonds. The first one is the dispersion in incomes induced by shocks to γ. The
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second one is the output shock y that affects the aggregate output in the economy. Finally,
the third one is the endogenous default risk. The goal of the government is to maximize the
expected utilities of households, and it achieves this goal by trying to equalize the marginal
utilities of consumption between households and across time. One government policy is to
choose optimal B′ that satisfies its goal, and the level of existing debt and the size of the
shocks are crucial for this decision. As debt accumulates, it becomes harder to roll it over
because of increases in default risk.
When the government chooses to default, consumption of the types are:
c1 =
1 + γ
2
yd (3.6)
and
c2 =
(1− γ)
2
yd, (3.7)
where yd is the level of output in default and yd = y − κ(y). The penalty is a function of
the output such that κ(y) = min{y,max{0, d0y + d1y2}}. The default penalty is higher, if
default happens in the good states of the world. This default penalty structure has been
used in many papers in the literature, such as Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012b).
3.3.3 Foreign Creditors
Foreign creditors can perfectly monitor the state of the economy and have perfect information
about the shock processes. They can borrow loans from international credit markets at a
constant interest rate r > 0, which is the risk-free interest rate for this model. Taking the
bond price function q(B′, y′, γ) as given, they choose loans B′ that maximize their expected
profits φ, given as
φ = q(B′, y, γ)B′ − 1− δ(B
′, y, γ)
1 + r
B′, (3.8)
where δ(B′, y, γ) is the probability of default and it is determined endogenously.
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q(B′, y, γ) =

1
1+r
B′ ≥ 0
1−δ(B′,y,γ)
1+r
B′ < 0.
The price function depends on the sign of B′. It is never optimal to default when the
government saves (B′ ≥ 0), so in that case, the price is a constant function of the risk-free
interest rate. On the other hand, if the government borrows (B′ < 0), then the price reflects
the default probability. This implies that as the default probability increases, the price of
the bond falls.
3.3.4 Timing
The timing in the model is as follows.
1. The government starts with initial assets B.
2. The output shock y and the inequality shock γ are realized.
3. The government decides whether to repay its debt obligations or default.
a. If the government decides to repay, then taking as given the bond price schedule
q(B′, y, γ), the government chooses B′ subject to the resource constraint. Then
creditors, taking q(B′, y, γ) as given, choose B′. Finally, households consume c1 and
c2 with respect to their types.
b. If the government chooses to default, then the economy is in financial autarky and
remains in autarky in the next period with probability θ. Households simply consume
their endowments.
3.3.5 Recursive Equilibrium
We focus on a recursive equilibrium, in which there is no enforcement. Based on the foreign
creditors’ problem, government’s debt demand is met as long as the gross return on the bond
equals (1 + r). Given loan size B′, inequality state γ and income state y, the bond price is
q(B′, y, γ) =
1− δ(B′, y, γ)
1 + r
. (3.9)
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The value function for the government that has the option to default or pay its debt is
given as vo(B, y, γ). Government chooses the option that maximizes the welfare of agents.
The default option will be optimal only if the government has debt. The value of default is
denoted by the function vd(y, γ), and the value of repayment is denoted by vc(B, y, γ).
vo(B, y, γ) = max
c,d
{vc(B, y, γ), vd(y, γ)}. (3.10)
The value of default is expressed by
vd(y, γ) = u
(
(1 + γ)ydef
2
)
+ u
(
(1− γ)ydef
2
)
+ β
∫
γ′
[θvo(0, y′, γ′) + (1− θ)vd(y′, γ′)]f(y′, γ′|y, γ)d(γ′, y′). (3.11)
Under default, individuals only consume their income. The government can gain access to
debt markets with probability θ, and the economy stays in autarky with probability 1 − θ.
The transition probabilities are given by the joint density function, f . Similarly, the value
of staying in contract is
vc(B, y, γ) = max
B′
u
(
(1 + γ)y − q(B′, y, γ)B′ +B
2
)
+ u
(
(1− γ)y − q(B′, y, γ)B′ +B
2
)
+ β
∫
y′,γ′
vo(B′, y′, γ′)f(y′, γ′|y, γ)d(γ′, y′). (3.12)
If the government chooses to repay its debt, the value function for this choice reflects the
future options for default and staying in contract. The government chooses the optimal bond
contract that maximizes the sum of utilities of the households and expected discounted future
value of option.
We can characterize the government’s default policy by default and repayment sets. Let
A(B) be the set of y and γ for which repayment is optimal when assets are B, such that
A(B) =
{
(y, γ) ∈ (Y,Γ) : vc(B, y, γ) ≥ vd(y, γ)} , (3.13)
and let D(B) = A˜(B) be the set of y, γ for which default is optimal for a level of assets B:
D(B) =
{
(y, γ) ∈ (Y,Γ) : vc(B, y, γ) < vd(y, γ)} . (3.14)
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Proposition 1. Given an output shock y, inequality shock γ and bond positions B1 < B2 ≤
0, if default is optimal for B2 then default will be optimal for B1, and the probability of
default at equilibrium satisfies δ(B1, y, γ) > δ(B2, y, γ).
Proof. See Appendix B.2.1.
This proposition formally states a feature of the model that Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
also have. It shows that in equilibrium default sets expand and the probability of default
increases as the level of debt in a country increases. The following proposition states that
equilibrium bond price decreases as the level of debt increases.
Proposition 2. Given an output shock y, inequality shock γ and bond positions B1 < B2 ≤
0, equilibrium bond price satisfies q(B1, y, γ) ≤ q(B2, y, γ).
Proof. See Appendix B.2.2.
Now we define the recursive equilibrium for this economy. Let s = {B, y, γ} be the set
of aggregate states for the economy.
Definition 2. The recursive equilibrium for this economy is defined as a set of policy func-
tions for (i) consumptions c1(s), c2(s); (ii) government’s asset holdings B′(s), repayment
sets A(B), and default sets D(B); and (iii) the price function for bonds q(B′, y, γ) such that:
1. Agents’ consumption c1(s) and c2(s) satisfy the resource constraints, taking the govern-
ment policies as given.
2. The government’s policy functions B′(s), repayment sets A(B), and default sets D(B)
satisfy the government optimization problem, taking the bond price function q(B′, y, γ)
as given.
3. Bonds prices q(B′, y, γ) reflect the government’s default probabilities and default proba-
bilities satisfy creditors’ expected zero profits.
In equilibrium, the bond price function should satisfy both the government’s optimization
problem and the expected zero profits in the lenders’ problem. As mentioned, the probability
of default endogenously affects the bond price. Using the default sets, we can express the
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probability of default such that:
δ(B′, y, γ) =
∫
D(B′)
f(y′, γ′|y, γ)d(y′, γ′). (3.15)
When default sets are empty, default is never optimal at the asset level B′, so the probability
of default equals zero, independent of the realized shock. When D(B′) = (Y,Γ), government
always chooses to default for all shock levels. Default sets are shrinking in assets.
3.4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION
3.4.1 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we describe the estimation procedure for the shock processes and then explain
the calibration strategy. We use the model to analyze the debt dynamics in Argentina
between 1990-2002, quantitatively. Focusing on an Argentine default episode enables us to
compare our results with the ones in the existing literature.
3.4.1.1 Calibration and Functional Forms We solve the model assuming that both
output and inequality shocks are in play. We call this the benchmark model. In the bench-
mark model, output and inequality shocks are modeled as a VAR process. Next, in order
to quantify the role of each shock and to assess the importance of the shocks in matching
the high volatilities and particularly high default rates observed in emerging economies, we
solve the model subject to only one shock at a time. Model II has only output shocks, and
we assume that output follows an AR(1) process. Model III has only inequality shocks and,
again, the inequality shock is modeled as an AR(1) process.
In the benchmark model, we assume that the VAR process for log output and inequality
is as follows: log(yt)
γt
 =
 cy
cγ
+
 ρyy ρyγ
ργy ργγ
 log(yt−1)
γt−1
+
 εyt
εγt
 ,
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where  cy
cγ
 =
I −
 ρyy ρyγ
ργy ργγ
 µy
µγ

ε =
 εyt
εγt

E [ε] = 0 and V ar [ε] =
 σ2y σyγ
σγy σ
2
γ
 .
The estimated values are derived from Argentina’s GDP and income inequality data
between 1991Q1 and 2005Q2. We use real output in quarterly, seasonally adjusted, real
series and covering the period 1993Q1 to 2001Q4 from the dataset in Arellano (2008).9
We take logs of GDP and detrend these series using an HP filter. The data pertaining
to inequality are constructed using the distribution of income series in World Development
Indicators provided by the World Bank. We choose the same period as for GDP. In order
to construct the inequality measure, we compute the total income share of the upper 50th
percentile and lower 50th percentile. Then, we take the difference of the income shares and
divide it by two, which gives us the dispersion from the mean income. Since only annual
data are available, we adopt the Boots-Feibes-Lisman method to disaggregate the annual
data into quarterly data. Both output and inequality shocks are then discretized into a
21-state Markov chain, using Tauchen (1986).
The discount factor β, and default penalty parameters d0 and d1 are jointly calibrated
to target a default probability of 3 percent, debt-to-GDP ratio of 5.53 percent and mean
spread of 6.23. We set the probability of reentry to 0.25, which implies it takes a year to
gain access to bond markets.10
9Arellano (2008) uses the data provided by the Ministry of Finance of Argentina.
10The calibrated value of β and the value of θ are close to the values used in the default literature. For
instance, Yue (2010) assumes that β = 0.72, and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) assume that β = 0.925. The
value of parameter θ implies that, on average, autarky takes four quarters, assuming that the distribution of
default lengths is exponential (Tomz and Wright (2007) and Pitchford and Wright (2011)). Dias et al. (2007)
empirically show that it takes 5.7 years, on average, for countries to regain partial access to international
capital markets and Gelos et al. (2011) document that average exclusion from the international markets
declined to two years in the 1990s; however, endogenous sovereign default models with exogenous entry to
the debt markets calibrate the parameter θ around 0.25. (Arellano (2008) chooses 0.282 and Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) choose 0.10).
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Table 3.3: A priori parameters for Model I
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% US 5-year bond quarterly yield
Risk aversion σ = 2
Probability of reentry θ = 0.25
Stochastic structure
[
ρyy ρyγ
ργy ργγ
]
=
[
0.95 −0.38
0.00 0.95
]
Argentina’s GDP[
σ2y σyγ
σγy σ
2
γ
]
=
[
0.0003 −0.0001
−0.0001 0.0001
]
and income inequality[
cy
cγ
]
=
[
0.12
0.01
]
Table 3.3 shows the parameters that we use for the benchmark model’s calibration. We
set the risk-free interest rate to 1.7 percent to match the US five-year Treasury bond quarterly
yield. The risk-aversion parameter σ is set to 2, as it is standard in the macro literature. We
also report the estimates of the parameters in the stochastic shock process. Note that the
correlation of the output at t and the inequality at t− 1, ρyγ, is negative. This means that
high inequality generates low output in the next period. Similarly, since ργy is equal to zero,
the output in the previous quarter does not affect the inequality in the current period. This
relationship between inequality and output is not unique to Argentina. We find that other
frequently defaulting economies, such as Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador
and Uruguay, also have similar results in terms of the signs of the estimates. These results
are reported in Table B3 in the Appendix B.1.
For Model II, we remove the stochastic inequality shocks by setting the level of inequality
to the mean inequality up to the default episode. This corresponds to setting γ equal to
0.66. The stochastic process for output is assumed to be a log-normal AR(1) process such
that
log(yt) = ρylog(yt−1) + yt, (3.16)
where E[yt] = 0 and E[
2
yt] = σ
2
y, which are estimated from Argentina’s GDP. We again
discretize the output process into a 21-state Markov chain using the Tauchen method. We
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Table 3.4: Calibrated parameters for Model I
Name Parameters Calibrated Target Value Target
Parameter
Discount rate β 0.925 Default probability 3 percent
Default penalty d0 -0.691 Debt service-to-GDP 5.45 percent
d1 0.095 Mean spread 6.23
keep all else the same as in the benchmark model. Table 3.5 presents the parameters for the
second model.
Similarly, we need to estimate the stochastic inequality process for Model III. We estimate
the following AR(1) process:
γt = (1− ργ)µγ + ργγt−1 + γt, (3.17)
where E[γt] = µγ and V ar(γt) = σ
2
γ, which are estimated from Argentina’s inequality data.
As with Model III, we discretize the inequality process into a 21-state Markov chain using
the Tauchen method. We keep all else the same as in benchmark model. The parameters
for the third model are presented in Table 3.6.
3.4.2 Model Solution
In this section, we begin with the analysis of the benchmark model’s results and then elab-
orate on the intuition behind the workings of the model. Our solution algorithm is given in
the Appendix B.3.
In our model, the benevolent government has two policy decisions to make: whether
to repay the existing debt or default; and how much to borrow or save using one-period
bonds. The government borrows to help households have smooth consumption and to shift
future consumption to today because the equilibrium interest rate is lower than government’s
discount rate. The level of optimal debt depends on the current assets and the state of the
world. Since lenders have full information about the state of the world and contracts are
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Table 3.5: A priori parameters for Model II
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% US 5-year bond quarterly yield
Risk aversion σ = 2
Discount rate β = 0.925
Default penalty d0 = −0.691
d1 = 0.095
Probability of reentry θ = 0.25
Inequality γ = 0.66 Mean income inequality in Argentina
Stochastic structure ρy = 0.9351 Argentina’s GDP
σy = 0.0190
Table 3.6: A priori parameters for Model III
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% US 5-year bond quarterly yield
Risk aversion σ = 2
Discount rate β = 0.925
Default penalty d0 = −0.691
d1 = 0.095
Probability of reentry θ = 0.25
Stochastic structure ργ = 0.9851 Argentina’s Inequality
σγ = 0.0037
µγ = 0.38
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not state-dependent, borrowing constraints can bind for the government, particularly in bad
states of the world, such as high inequality and low output. Therefore, we observe that bond
prices depend on the level of assets and the types of shocks that the economy is subject to.
In the model, since the endowment is shared unequally among households, even in the
absence of the shocks, the poor agents’ marginal utility of consumption is higher than that
of rich agents. An adverse output shock increases both agents’ marginal utility of consump-
tion, but an adverse inequality shock raises the marginal utility of the poor and reduces
the marginal utility of the rich, increasing the dispersion between the marginal utilities of
consumption. Defaults are more likely when there are adverse shocks and high levels of
debt because the lenders offer bond contracts that have higher interest rates in these states.
This makes the government borrowing-constrained and imposes large taxes on households
in order to finance the debt. An adverse inequality shock exacerbates the burden of the
tax, particularly on the poor, because it increases the poor’s marginal utility of consumption
disproportionately. In this case, the government can choose to default and use default as
a redistribution mechanism. This policy improves welfare because, by eliminating the tax
burden, the government can alleviate the dispersion.
First, we analyze our results related to policy functions and value functions in the bench-
mark model. We report the results based on four different combinations of output and in-
equality shocks. A low (high) shock is one standard deviation below (above) its mean for
each type of shock. The level of assets is denoted as a fraction of GDP. Then, we look at
the business cycle statistics that the model generates.
Figure 3.2 shows the bond price schedule and the interest rate generated by the model.
On the x-axis we have assets as a fraction of output. Similar to the results presented in the
standard default literature, such as Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), we
observe that bond prices are an increasing function of assets, such that high levels of debt
entail a low bond price and a high interest rate. Fixing the level of inequality shocks, we
observe that it is easier to borrow during expansions than during recessions. However, the
results also show that the effect of a high output shock can be dominated by the effect of
a high inequality shock. In other words, an economy that is subject to both high output
and high inequality shocks can have a bond price that is lower than that when there are low
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Figure 3.2: Bond prices and interest rate (Model I)
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output and low inequality shocks.
The lower panel in Figure 3.2 shows the annual equilibrium interest rates generated by
the model. The interest rate is calculated as 1/q(B′, y, γ) − 1. Inequality shocks generate
another source of risk that is reflected in interest rates. The highest level of borrowing is
possible when there is high output and low inequality in the economy. Government borrowing
is subject to higher interest rates, even for small amounts of debt that are above the level of
default in high-inequality and or low-output states.
The top panel in Figure 3.3 shows the saving policy function conditional on not default-
ing. Our results show that the government borrows more in expansions and when there is low
inequality. This result is consistent with the countercyclical interest rates, since it becomes
more costly to borrow in bad states of the world. The bottom panel of Figure 3.3 is the
value function for the option to default or repay as a function of assets. Again, inequality
plays a significant role in the default decision. The flat regions of the value function show
the range of debt for which default is optimal. The value functions show that the highest
debt can be supported, when there is high output and low inequality in the economy.
3.4.3 Business Cycle Results
3.4.3.1 Data First, we document the business cycle characteristics of the Argentine
economy. For the business cycle statistics, we use real output, consumption and trade
balance data in quarterly, seasonally adjusted, real series for the period 1993Q1 and 2001Q4
from the dataset in Arellano (2008).11 We take logs of GDP and consumption series and
apply a linear trend on these series following Arellano (2008).12 The trade balance data are
a fraction of GDP. We also borrow Arellano (2008)’s spread data, which are defined as the
difference between the interest rate in Argentina and the yield of the five-year U.S. treasury
bond. The interest rate series is EMBI for Argentina and starts from 1983Q3. For the mean
and standard deviation of the spread we use the period between 1993Q1 and 2001Q1. The
inequality series is the one we constructed to generate a shock process, as explained in the
11Arellano (2008) uses the data provided by the Ministry of Finance of Argentina.
12Analysis using HP filtered series (with smoothing parameter 1600) also produces similar results for
correlations.
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Figure 3.3: Savings and value functions (Model I)
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Table 3.7: Business cycle statistics for Argentina
Default episode
x: Q1-2002 std(x) corr(x, y) corr(x, rc)
Interest rate spread (%) 28.60 2.77 -0.88
Trade balance (% of GDP) 9.90 1.75 -0.64 0.70
Consumption (% deviation from trend) -16.01 8.59 0.98 -0.89
Output (% deviation from trend) -14.21 7.78 -0.88
Inequality (% deviation from mean ineq.) 8.6 1.71 -0.23 0.55
previous section.
Table 3.7 presents the business cycle statistics of all the data available up to the default
episode that started on December 26, 2001. Consumption and output in the first column
show the deviations from the trend, and the other values are in levels in the first quarter
of 2002. Relative to the average inequality in the series, in the default episode, inequality
increased by 8.6 percent. The second column shows the standard deviations up to the
default episode. We find that consumption is more volatile than output. The third and the
fourth columns present the correlations of each variable with the output and the interest rate
spread, respectively. It has been shown that emerging market economies are characterized
by countercyclical spread rates and net exports. Also, their consumption is highly correlated
with output. We see similar empirical results for Argentina in column 3. In addition, we show
that inequality is countercyclical with output, so the economy has high inequality during
recessions. The interest rate spread is negatively correlated with consumption and output,
and positively correlated with trade balance. The data show that inequality is positively
correlated with the spread, which implies that inequality increases during times of risky
borrowing.
3.4.3.2 Simulation Results Next, we move on to the business cycle statistics generated
by the benchmark model and evaluate the performance of the model with Argentine data.
The upper panel of Table 3.8 presents the simulation results for the benchmark model, which
generates a default probability of 2.80, debt-to-GDP ratio of 5.53 percent and mean spread
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of 4.90. High volatility of interest rates is a consequence of high default probability. We
observe a large increase in the spread during default episodes, which is close to the data.
In Argentina, in the couple of months following the default, quarterly spreads reached to
5,000-6,000 basis points. The model also generates large drops in consumption and output
during default episodes. Inequality increases by 9.09 percent relative to its mean, which is
also close to the increase observed during the default episode (8.60 percent). The model
can also generate high volatility in consumption and output. The volatility of inequality is
slightly lower than the value observed in the data.
Table 3.8: Simulation results for the benchmark model
Default episodes std(x) corr(x,y) corr(x, rc)
Model I: Shocks to output and inequality
Interest rate spread (%) 59.82 9.94 −0.20 -
Trade balance (% of GDP) −0.01 0.91 −0.12 0.29
Total Consumption (% deviation from trend) −7.19 5.82 0.99 −0.25
Output (% deviation from trend) −7.29 5.63 − −0.20
Inequality (% deviation from mean ineq.) 7.45 0.70 −0.28 0.16
Other Statistics
Mean debt (percent output) 5.53 Mean spread 4.90
Default probability 2.80
In terms of correlations with output, the simulations can generate a positive correlation
with consumption and a negative correlation with the interest rate spread.13 We also obtain
a negative correlation between output and trade balance. The reason is that when there
are only output shocks, households can consume more than the level of the output during
expansions because the government can borrow easily. On the other hand, when there is
a recession, borrowing is constrained; therefore, the consumption is less than the output.
This generates a countercyclical trade balance over the business cycle. We see a positive
correlation between the spread and the trade balance. Since the spread reflects the risk
due to both inequality and output shocks, it is more correlated with the bad states of the
13See Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) for the role of
countercyclical interest rates in emerging markets.
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world, in which the government is more likely to face borrowing constraints and experience
large trade balances. As we expected, inequality is negatively correlated with output and
positively correlated with the spread. Table 3.9 shows our model’s performance relative
to Arellano (2008). The benchmark model does quantitatively a similar job with Arellano
(2008) in terms of matching the data.
Table 3.9: Simulation results for the benchmark model: Comparison with Arellano (2008)
Data Benchmark Model Arellano (2008)
Volatilities
σ(c)/σ(y) 1.09 1.04 1.10
σ(tb)/σ(y) 0.17 0.16 0.26
Correlations
corr(y,spread) −0.88 −0.20 −0.29
corr(y,c) 0.98 0.98 0.97
corr(y,tb) −0.64 −0.12 −0.25
corr(y,inequality) −0.23 −0.28 −
corr(spread,c) −0.89 −0.25 −0.36
corr(spread,tb) 0.70 0.29 0.43
corr(spread,inequality) 0.55 0.16 −
Other Statistics
Mean Debt (percent output) 5.53 5.41 5.95
Mean Spread 6.23 4.90 3.54
Default Probability 3.00 2.80 3.00
We solve and simulate Model II and Model III, in order to assess the role of output shocks
and inequality shocks in default risk. The simulation results for Model II and Model III are
given in Table 3.10. We find that the default probability is around 0.52 percent when there
are output shocks and 0.32 percent when there are inequality shocks. We obtain a probability
of default when the economy is subject to output shocks that is slightly higher than the model
with inequality shocks because the default penalties are different in two models. In the case
of output shocks, the default penalty increases in good states of the world and decreases in
bad states of the world; thus with smaller penalty and tighter borrowing constraints in bad
states, we observe a larger default rate. On the other hand, in model III the default penalty
is constant across all states because aggregate output is constant. This generates a lower
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probability of default in model III.
We also find that the default risk in both Model II and Model III is lower than that
in the benchmark model. This is strong evidence that shows that the amplification effect
comes from the underlying joint shock process. The reason behind this result is the VAR(1)
process that we systematically estimated from the Argentine data. Based on the estimated
process, it is more likely to have adverse output and inequality shocks together. Moreover,
high inequality at time t − 1 leads to lower output at time t. These characteristics play an
important role in altering the expectations of foreign lenders and the government about the
future state of the economy. An adverse inequality shock not only amplifies the effect of an
adverse output shock today, but also generates pessimism that the recession with increasing
inequality may be long-lasting.14 As a result, foreign lenders ask for a higher premium, even
for smaller levels of debt. This increases the borrowing constraints on the government, and
default becomes an optimal decision.
Table 3.10: Simulation results for Model II and Model III
Model II Model III
Default episodes std(x) Default episodes std(x)
Interest rate spread (%) 9.70 1.46 1.78 0.68
Trade balance −0.03 2.15 −0.02 0.98
Total Consumption −2.78 5.65 −2.92 0.99
Output −8.00 4.46 −7.99 0.00
Inequality 0.00 0.00 2.63 1.15
Other Statistics
Mean debt (percent output) 52.76 48.46
Default probability 0.52 0.32
Mean Spread 0.63 0.44
14In order to disentangle the effect of inequality on output in the next period, when we generate the
Markov process, we assume that ρyγ = 0 and ργy = 0 . Under this specification, we find that the probability
of default falls to 1.96 percent. This result shows that two thirds of the default risk comes from the fact that
the covariances of the shocks are negative.
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Table 3.11: A priori parameters for Mexico
Name Parameters Description
Risk-free interest rate r = 1.7% US 5-year bond quarterly yield
Risk aversion σ = 2
Probability of reentry θ = 0.25
Stochastic structure
[
ρyy ρyγ
ργy ργγ
]
=
[
0.90 −0.17
0.02 0.94
]
Mexico GDP[
σ2y σyγ
σγy σ
2
γ
]
=
[
0.0001 0.0002
0.0002 0.00005
]
and income inequality[
cy
cγ
]
=
[
0.05
0.02
]
3.5 ALTERNATIVE CALIBRATION
We obtain the main results regarding the effects of inequality shocks using Argentine data.
In this section, we calibrate the model for Mexico. Our goal in this exercise is to see whether
the model can match the business cycle statistics of Mexico and whether the model can
also explain differences in consumption volatilities across income groups that we observe
in the data. Since we do not have the consumption distribution data for Argentina, we
focus on Mexican economy for this exercise. Like Argentina, Mexico experienced several
default episodes. We focus on the crises in the last century when we compute the default
probability. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), Mexico experienced external default
or restructuring in 1914, 1928 and 1982 and it was near default in 1994. Depending on
whether we include the last incidence, we get a default probability between 3-4 percent;
therefore we choose 3.5 percent as the default rate.15
We repeat the steps for Argentina when we estimate the shock processes for Mexico.
Table 3.11 shows a-priori parameters that we used in the simulations in order to obtain the
15If we count the number of default or restructuring episodes starting from the country’s year of indepen-
dence, then we consider the period between 1828 and 2015 for Mexico. There are in total 9 crises episodes,
which lead to a higher default rate around 4-5 percent. The data on external debt crisis are from (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2011). An external debt crisis is defined as the failure to meet the principal or interest payment
on the due date by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). The episodes also include instances where the principal or
interest payment is rescheduled at less favorable terms than the original contract.
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Table 3.12: Calibrated parameters for Mexico
Name Parameters Calibrated Target Value Target
Parameter
Discount rate β 0.90 Default probability 3.5 percent
Default penalty d0 -1.37 Debt service-to-GDP 4.5 percent
d1 0.15 Mean spread 4.2
business cycle statistics for Mexico. We use the same values for the risk-free interest rate and
the risk aversion parameter as in the previous sections. The stochastic shock processes come
from the VAR estimations based on Mexico’s GDP and income distribution data. The data
cover the period between 1995-2012. We find the estimate for ρyγ is negative and it implies
that inequality in the previous period reduces the output in the current period. However
the covariances of the errors are not negative, which implies that Mexico is more likely to
receive a low inequality shock together with a low output shock.
We follow the same calibration strategy. Table 3.12 shows the calibrated parameter
values. We jointly calibrate the discount rate (β) and the output cost in autarky parameters
(d0 and d1), in order to match the default probability of 3.5 percent, debt service-to-GDP
ratio of 4.5 percent and the mean spread 4.2 in Mexico.16 We compute the business cycle
statistics using quarterly seasonally adjusted real GDP, real consumption and trade balance
data from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We detrend the consumption and
output series and we focus on the period between 1993q1 and 2012q4.
The simulation results are given in Table 3.13. In terms of matching the targets, the
model does well except that it generates higher debt service-to-GDP ratio than we observe
in the data. We see that the model can match the main business cycle characteristics for
Mexico, such as spreads that are countercyclical, consumption that is procyclical over the
business cycle and consumption that is highly correlated with output. We get high volatility
16We borrow debt service-to-GDP statistic from Cuadra et al. (2010). Debt service to GDP data cover the
years from 1980 to 2007 and the spread covers the period from 2000q1 to 2012q4. We compute the spread
as the difference between the interest rates on government securities and treasury bills of Mexico and the
U.S., both data are retrieved from FRED database provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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of consumption relative to output. Also, the trade balance is positively correlated with the
spread; however, it is acyclical with output.
Table 3.13: Business cycle statistics for
Mexico
Mexico Simulation Data
corr(spread, y) -0.57 -0.52
corr(spread, tb) 0.44 0.68
corr(spread, tc) -0.72 -0.53
corr(tb, y) 0.01 -0.87
corr(tc, y) 0.86 0.97
std(tc)/std(y) 1.19 1.09
std(cpoor)/std(crich) 1.05 1.10
Targets
Default probability 3.78% 3.5%
Debt service-to-GDP 9.9% 4.5%
Mean spread 4.44 4.20
Note: Total consumption and trade bal-
ance are denoted by tc and tb, respec-
tively. The consumption volatilities of
the rich and poor are yearly, the rest of
the statistics are at quarterly frequency.
We can also compute consumption volatilities for the rich and poor households using this
model. We use Mexico Household Income and Expenditure Survey data between 1992 and
2008. We compute the consumption of the upper and lower 50 percentile of the households
in order to make the statistics comparable with the model. In the data, we find that con-
sumption volatility of the poor household is slightly higher than the rich household’s and
the ratio of volatilities is 1.09. Since survey data set is annual, using the simulated results
and aggregating the data we convert the consumption of the poor and rich households to
annual frequency. In our model, consumption volatility of the poor households is also higher
than that of the rich and the ratio is close to its data counterpart. Incomplete asset markets
together with income shocks are key for this result. In our model income inequality shocks
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amplify the effect of output shocks particularly on the poor households’ endowment. Since
there are no other assets that the households can use to insure against these shocks, poor
households have higher volatility of consumption than rich households.
3.6 PROGRESSIVE INCOME TAXES
In the previous sections, we assume that government distributes the proceeds of the debt
payments equally between the households. As mentioned above, these proceeds can function
as taxes when they are negative and they can function as transfers, otherwise. Since these
payments are lump sum, the burden (benefit) of taxes (transfers) relative to endowment is
quite different across the households. Particularly, the burden of lump sum taxes is on the
poor. Therefore, this brings up the question: How would the probability of default change in
an economy if the government could use progressive income taxes to finance the debt when
it is costly to borrow?
We impose the following tax regime:
T (yi) =
0 B − qB
′ ≥ 0,
yi − λ(yi)1−τ B − qB′ < 0.
As τ increases the tax function becomes more progressive, and when τ = 1, both types of
households consume equally. The parameter λ is called the shift parameter and determines
the average tax rate. If B − qB′ is positive, the government only distributes the proceeds
of the debt operations across households as transfers similar to the benchmark model. If
B − qB′ is negative, then the government uses the revenues from the taxes to finance the
debt. The budget constraint of the government for the latter case is given as:
T (y1) + T (y2) +B − qB′ = 0. (3.18)
One can solve for λ using the budget constraint of the government:
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y1 − λ(y1)1−τ + y2 − λ(y2)1−τ +B − qB′ = 0
y − λ[(y1)1−τ + (y2)1−τ ] +B − qB′ = 0
λ[(y1)1−τ + (y2)1−τ ] = y +B − qB′
λ =
y +B − qB′
(y1)1−τ + (y2)1−τ
.
The disposable incomes are denoted by y˜i for each type of household i. When B − qB′ < 0,
we get:
y˜1 = λ(y1)1−τ ,
=
(y +B − qB′)(y1)1−τ
(y1)1−τ + (y2)1−τ
.
y˜2 = λ(y2)1−τ ,
=
(y +B − qB′)(y2)1−τ
(y1)1−τ + (y2)1−τ
.
We can write the budget constraints of the households if the government does not choose to
default as:
c1 =
y
1 + B−qB
′
2
B − qB′ > 0,
(y+B−qB′)(y1)1−τ
(y1)1−τ+(y2)1−τ B − qB′ ≤ 0.
c2 =
y
2 + B−qB
′
2
B − qB′ > 0,
(y+B−qB′)(y2)1−τ
(y1)1−τ+(y2)1−τ B − qB′ ≤ 0.
If the government chooses to default, we assume that the progressive taxes are in effect. The
budget constraints during autarky are:
63
c1 =
yd(yd,1)1−τ
(yd,1)1−τ + (yd,2)1−τ
,
c2 =
yd(yd,2)1−τ
(yd,1)1−τ + (yd,2)1−τ
.
Table 3.14: Effect of τ1 on default probability and debt
τ = 0 τ = 0.1 τ = 0.20 τ = 0.3 τ = 0.4
Mean debt (% output) 26.32 27.44 28.02 28.65 28.98
Mean spread (%) 5.43 4.78 4.60 4.50 4.28
Probability of default (%) 2.92 2.32 1.85 1.68 1.46
We recalibrate the model in order to match 3 percent default probability and mean
spread of 6.3, when τ = 0.17 We simulate the model for five different values of τ ∈
{0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4} and analyze how the progressivity of the tax system affects the proba-
bility of default and debt-to-output ratio. Table 3.14 shows the results. The model with
τ = 0 has mean debt of 26.32 percent. As τ increases, we obtain higher mean debt. Mov-
ing from τ = 0 to τ = 0.4, the probability of default decreases from 2.92 percent to 1.68
percent. The reason is that taxes reduce the dispersion in marginal utilities of consumption
between households, by taxing the rich more than the poor. As the dispersion gets smaller,
the government has less incentive to default. Therefore, foreign lenders lend higher levels of
debt to the government and the mean spread declines monotonically.
17The calibrated parameters are β = 0.895, d0 = −0.56 and we fix d1 = 0.095.
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3.7 CONCLUSION
This paper studies the role of increasing income inequality in sovereign borrowing and de-
fault decisions using a stochastic general equilibrium model in a small open economy with
endogenous default risk. To motivate the idea, we analyze the nexus among the Gini index,
sovereign bond ratings and GDP per capita using a panel data set. The results show that
high inequality lowers the creditworthiness of long-term government bonds significantly. The
paper also shows that the inequality is countercyclical over the business cycle for the average
country. Next, using a model that belongs to the class of models of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and extending it to allow for heterogeneous agents and shocks to the distribution of
income, the paper shows analytically that inequality shocks can generate a high probability
of default when the markets are incomplete. Using Argentine data, the model predicts a de-
fault probability of 2.8 percent and also matches the business cycle characteristics observed
in the data, such as the high volatility of consumption and output, the counter-cyclical in-
terest rates, and positive correlations between the trade balance and interest rates, as well
as, inequality and interest rates. Our model’s contribution is to highlight the redistributive
effects of default as a policy that improves the welfare of the households. The model can also
explain the differences in consumption volatilities across different income groups, which has
not been shown by the earlier papers in the literature. As a policy extension, we show that
progressive income taxes can reduce the default risk and increase the debt-to-output ratio.
Rising income inequality is a general problem that many countries have experienced.
Therefore, it is important to understand how inequality induces economic crises and sovereign
defaults that last several years and cause large losses. Even though our paper provides a
first step toward analyzing the role of income inequality, we abstract from the determinants
of income inequality and model it as an exogenous shock. We think that it is also impor-
tant to study what drives high income inequality and how it affects agents’ welfare and a
government’s decision to default. We leave these issues for future study.
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4.0 EXPORT AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM
CHILEAN PLANTS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Export-oriented growth has been an important component of the economic success of a
number of countries. There have been numerous empirical studies on firm’s performance and
entry into export markets. These studies have generally found that more productive firms
have a higher tendency to enter into export markets and less productive firms have a higher
tendency to exit from international markets, which is called the self-selection hypothesis.
Research has also suggested that export firms may improve their productivity more than non-
exporting firms, which is called the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. While self-selection is
a common finding in a number of empirical studies, conclusive evidence for the learning-by-
exporting hypothesis is not always found.
To test the hypotheses, three empirical methods are used: regression method, matched
sampling technique and the stochastic dominance method. In the regression method, self-
selection is tested by whether a firm’s export decision is affected by productivity of the firm
in the previous year. The learning-by-exporting hypothesis is tested by whether productiv-
ity of export firms increases more than non-exporting firms. Bernard and B. Jensen (1999)
propose a method to test the hypotheses. While their results support the former hypoth-
esis, they fail to confirm the latter hypothesis. Following Bernard and B. Jensen (1999),
a number of other studies commonly confirm the self-selection hypothesis using firm-level
data from various countries and periods. However, the learning-by-exporting hypothesis is
only detected in some specific countries and times.1 The matched sampling technique fo-
1See Alvarez and Lo´pez (2005), Clerides et al. (1998), Damijan et al. (2004), and Fernandes and Isgut
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cuses on the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. After setting up non-exporting firms as a
control group, one tests how significantly different productivity of export firms and that of
the control group are. A number of previous studies rely on data from a specific country
and period.2 The stochastic dominance method makes use of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
to see whether the productivity distribution of export firms dominates that of non-exporting
firms. If the hypothesis on the equality of distribution is rejected and the one on the differ-
ence favorable to export firms’ distribution over that of non-exporting firms is accepted, it is
said that export firms self-select when entering into international markets. To examine the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis, the distributions of productivity growth of export firms
and non-exporting firms are tested.3
To test the self-selection hypothesis and the learning-by-exporting hypothesis with the
three methods, I use Chilean plant-level data for 1995-2007. Alvarez and Lo´pez (2005)
examined self-selection and learning effects with Chilean plants during 1990-1996. They
used a regression method with categorized types of plants and concluded that both effects
are detected from the data. While Chile’s economy showed stable growth during 1990-1996
in terms of GDP, its behavior changed after 1997. Specifically, Chile’s economy suffered
from a short-term recession in 1999 and it affected the behavior of plants because more
exits and fewer entries in export markets happened around 1999 than before. Therefore, I
conjecture that Chilean plants which enter into export markets after a recession will show
higher productivity growth than those that entered before a recession. Besides the learning-
by-exporting hypothesis, I examine the productivity growth of plants before and after entry
into export markets.
I confirm that the self-selection hypothesis and the learning-by-exporting hypothesis are
detected from Chilean plants even with different empirical methods. In particular, the self-
selection hypothesis is confirmed by the regression method and the stochastic dominance
method. The regression method and the matched sampling technique provide us with the
evidence of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis.
(2005).
2See Arnold and Hussinger (2005), Kostevc (2005), De Loecker (2007), Girma et al. (2003), Girma et al.
(2004a), Greenaway and Kneller (2007), Greenaway and Kneller (2008), and Yasar and Rejesus (2005).
3See Delgado et al. (2002).
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In the next section, I present empirical methods with related literatures. In section 3, I
discuss the characteristics of the data. Section 4 and 5 contain the results of self-selection
and learning effects, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL METHODS
In empirical studies on productivity and export behavior, three analysis methods are pri-
marily used. One representative method is the regression method proposed by Bernard et
al. (1995). Another one is the matched sampling technique which was recently used in a
number of empirical studies. The last one is a non-parametric method with the concept of
stochastic dominance devised by Delgado et al. (2002). In the following sections, I review
some studies of exports and productivity using different methods and their results for the
self-selection and the learning-by-exporting hypotheses.
4.2.1 Regression Method
The regression approach follows Bernard and B. Jensen (1999). For self-selection, they
consider the following linear probability model with fixed effects.
Xit = α + β Controlit−1 + γ Xit−1 + εit
where Xit is the export decision of firm i at time t, Controlit−1 is a vector of firm i’s
characteristics including firm’s productivity.
To avoid the biasedness and inconsistency of estimates, they make use of the following
linear probability models in first differences, using as instruments, Xit−2, Xit−3, Controlit−2,
Controlit−3.
4Xit = β4Controlit−1 + γ4Xit−1 +4εit
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Recent studies in Table 4.1 make use of the probit model for the self-selection as below.
Pr(Xit = 1|Xit−1 = 0) = Φ(β PRODit−1 + δ′Controlit−1 + γs + γt + it)
where PRODit−1 is firm i’s productivity at time t− 1, γs and γt are the dummies for sector
and time, respectively. We can predict the probability of exporting in the current period for
a firm that was not in export markets in the previous period based on its characteristics and
productivity in the previous period.
For the learning effect, they use the following regression model with dummy variables of
some specific firm types.
PRODiT − PRODi0 = α + β1StartiT + β2BothiT + β3StopiT + γControli0 + iT
where Controli0 is a vector of firm i’s characteristics at the initial time, and the dummies
for export status are defined as follows:
StartiT = 1 if (X i0 = 0) and (X iT = 1)
BothiT = 1 if (X i0 = 1) and (X iT = 1)
StopiT = 1 if (X i0 = 1) and (X iT = 0)
In the regression, the productivity difference between the initial and the final period
is affected by a firm’s exporting behavior in the initial and the final period. If I have a
significant β1 in estimation, I can say that export firms improve their productivity more
than non-export firms.
Table 4.1 present studies using the regression method with their findings. Alvarez and
Lo´pez (2005) detect both effects using Chilean plant-level data. Bernard and B. Jensen
(1999) discover self-selection but not the learning effect with the U.S. firm-level data for
1984-1992. Clerides et al. (1998) consider Colombia, Mexico and Morocco and find scant
evidence for the learning effect. Interestingly, they set a dynamic model of export decisions
and compare the simulation results with the data results. Damijan et al. (2004) consider the
heterogeneity in export markets as well as firms. They conclude that different destinations
affect the productivity improvement after entry into export markets. Exporters to advanced
countries benefit more in terms of productivity than exporters to less advanced countries.
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Table 4.1: Empirical studies using the regression method
Study Country and period
Findings
Self-selection Learning-by-
exporting
Alvarez and Lo´pez
(2005)
Chile (1990-1996) Yes Yes
Bernard and B. Jensen
(1999)
U.S. (1984-1992) Yes No
Clerides et al. (1998) Colombia (1981-1991),
Mexico (1986-1990),
Morocco (1984-1991)
Yes No
Damijan et al. (2004) Slovenia (1994-2002) Yes Yes only when
serving advanced
countries
Fernandes and Isgut
(2005)
Colombia (1981-1991) Yes Yes
Fernandes and Isgut (2005) focus on young firms and export experience rather than on
export participation using Arrow (1962)’s characterization of learning-by-doing. The learning
effect is the main interest of their study. They use the matched sampling approach as well
as regression and the general method of moment. With Colombian plant-level data, they
conclude that young plants in export markets show learning-by-exporting but not young
non-exporting plants or old exporting plants.
4.2.2 Matched Sampling Technique
The matched sampling technique has recently been used in many studies on the learning-by-
exporting hypothesis. The main idea of the method is to compare the differences of the same
exporting firms when they actually export and when they hypothetically do not export.
E[PROD1it+s|Xi = 1]− E[PROD0it+s|X i = 1]
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where PROD1it+s is productivity of export firm i at time t+s and PROD
0
it+s is productivity
of non-exporting firm i at time t+ s. Since the latter term is not observed in the data, I use
a propensity score method to find a non-exporting firm which has productivity in the initial
time similar with a export firm. Specifically, I adopt the following probit model to give each
firm its own score based on its characteristics in the previous period.
P (Xit = 1) = Φ(h(Controlit−1, PRODit−1, · · · ))
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. From
the probit model above, each firm has a probability of entering into export markets. The
export firms are the treated group and the non-exporting firms with a probability as much
as the export firms are the control group.
With the control group as matched samples, they derive the following estimator of the
learning-by-exporting effect.
βsLBE =
1
Ns
∑
i
{PROD1is −
1
ni
∑
j∈C(i)
PROD0js}
where s ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , S} denotes the years after entering into export markets, Ns is the
number of firms who entered the markets at time s, PROD1 and PROD0 are the estimated
productivity of the treated and the control group, and C(i) is the set of the control firms
matched to firm i based on propensity score. The weight is ni which is the size of C(i).
Table 4.2 presents some studies with the matched sampling technique for different coun-
tries and periods. De Loecker (2007), Girma et al. (2003), Girma et al. (2004a) and Wagner
(2002) focus only on the learning effect and present conclusive evidence on it. Greenaway
et al. (2005) do not confirm the learning effect as well as the self-selection hypothesis due
to the extremely high openness of Swedish economy. Greenaway and Kneller (2007) argue
that post-entry productivity growth of new export firms is faster than non-export firms and
also that the magnitude of these effects is affected by industry characteristics. Greenaway
and Kneller (2008) not only present unambiguous evidence on self-selection and learning-by-
exporting, but also show that regional and industry agglomerations positively influence the
international market participation.
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Table 4.2: Empirical studies using the matched sampling approach
Study Country and period
Findings
Self-selection Learning-by-
exporting
Arnold and Hussinger
(2005)
Germany (1992-2000) Yes No
De Loecker (2007) Slovenia (1994-2000) - Yes
Fernandes and Isgut
(2005)
Colombia (1981-1991) Yes Yes
Girma et al. (2003) UK (1991-1997) - Yes
Girma et al. (2004a) UK (1988-1999) Yes Yes
Greenaway et al. (2005) Sweden (1980-1997) No No
Greenaway and Kneller
(2007)
UK (1989-1998) Yes Yes
Greenaway and Kneller
(2008)
UK (1989-2002) Yes Yes
Kostevc (2005) Slovenia (1994-2002) Yes No
Wagner (2002) Germany (1978-1989) - Yes
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4.2.3 Stochastic Dominance Method
The non-parametric method with the concept of stochastic dominance was proposed by
Delgado et al. (2002). This method examines the whole productivity distribution of exporters
and non-exporters rather than marginal moments. Thus, it gives us information on whether
productivity of the entire set of export firms is better than that of the entire set of non-
exporters. Denote F (·) and G(·) the cumulative distribution functions of exporters and
non-exporters, respectively. Then, they test the following hypotheses:
(i) Two-sided test
H0 : F (z)−G(z) = 0 for all z ∈ R vs. H1 : F (z)−G(z) 6= 0 for some z ∈ R
(ii) One-sided test
H0 : F (z)−G(z) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ R vs. H1 : F (z)−G(z) > 0 for some z ∈ R
If the null hypothesis for the two-sided test is rejected, it means that the productivity
distribution of exporters cannot be the same as that of non-exporters. If the one-sided test
cannot be rejected after rejecting the hypothesis of the equality of the productivity distribu-
tions between exporters and non-exporters, I can say that the productivity distribution of
exporters stochastically dominates that of non-exporters. For these two-sided and one-sided
tests, the following Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics are used, respectively.
δN =
√
nm
N
max
1≤i≤N
|TN(Zi)| and ηN =
√
nm
N
max
1≤i≤N
{TN(Zi)}
where TN = Fn(Zi) − Gm(Zi), N = n + m, n and m are the number of exporters and non-
exporters, Fn(·) and Gm(·) are the empirical distribution functions of F (·) and G(·). The
limiting distributions of both test statistics, δN and ηN , are known under independence. For
more details see the footnote 1 in Delgado et al. (2002).
In Table 4.3, I review studies using stochastic dominance method for their empirical
analysis. Delgado et al. (2002) examine self-selection and learning-by-exporting, and present
supporting evidence of self-selection. However, the learning effect is supported only by young
export firms. In addition, a number of studies pay attention to foreign direct investment
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Table 4.3: Empirical studies using the stochastic dominance method
Study Country and period Findings
Arnold and
Hussinger (2010)
Germany (1996-2002) Exporters’ productivity distribution
dominates that of non-exporters
Delgado et al. (2002) Spain (1991-1996) Self-selection for all export firms and
learning-by-exporting for young export
firms
Girma et al. (2004b) Ireland (2000) Domestic multinationals have highest
productivity distribution than domestic
non-exporters and domestic exporters
(FDI) as well as export with this method. Girma et al. (2004b) and Girma et al. (2005)
consider three types of firms: domestic non-exporters, domestic exporters and domestic
multinationals which invest through FDI. They compare the productivity measures and
cumulative distribution of productivity for those three types of firms. Interestingly, domestic
multinationals have the highest level of productivity and distribution. Wagner (2006) also
considers FDI as a way for a firm to participate in international markets and derives the
similar result as Girma et al. (2004b) and Girma et al. (2005).
4.3 DATA
I use the Chilean plant-level data from 1995 to 2007 based on the Annual National Industrial
Survey (ENIA) carried out by the National Institute of Statistics of Chile. This survey is
done annually for about 5,000 plants and so during the analysis period, I have approximately
70,000 observations. Table 4.4 shows the periods and export experience of plants in the data.
There are 10,909 plants that appear in the data for at least one year. Among them, 34.3
percent appear in the panel for less than three years and 29.0 percent stay in the panel for
more than 10 years. In addition, 15.9 percent of them stayed in the data for 13 years. 74.8
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percent of all plants are not in the export market; 11.6 percent of the plants participate in
export markets less than three years and 2.1 percent stay in international markets for 13
years.
In Table 4.5, I show the average characteristics of plants in the data. On average, among
the 5,378 plants exporters are 20.1 percent and non-exporters are 79.9 percent. When it
comes to the ownership of plants, plants with national private ownership are the majority
which account for 92.7 percent of all plants. Small plants are 70.6 percent of all plants;
medium and large ones are 18.6 percent and 10.8 percent, respectively. The distribution of
export plants is different from that of non-export plants. While small plants are the majority
of non-exporters, medium-sized and large plants are the majority of exporters.
Table 4.6 presents the annual rate of plants’ exit from and entry into export markets.
While the exit rate has kept stable at around 19 percent between 1996 and 1998, it started
to increase in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The entry rate dropped significantly in 1998 and 1999,
and jumped back in 2000. It seems that plants behaved differently before and after the short
recession in 1999. Before the recession, plants were stable in terms of entry and exit rate,
but around the recession, exit rates increased and entry rates dropped a lot. The drop in
GDP growth rate in 1998 and the short-term recession in 1999 may have caused Chilean
plants to exit from and enter into export markets more often between 1999 and 2001.
To analyze self-selection and learning-by-exporting, I divide plant types into more cat-
egories. I have seven types of plants based on their export behaviors following Alvarez and
Lo´pez (2005). Permanent exporters stayed in export markets for 13 years. Non-exporters
are the opposite of permanent exporters. Quitters, entrants-stay, entrants-exit, switchers
and participants are introduced instead of entrants and exiters. Quitters started to export
before 1995 and ended exporting before 2007. Entrants-stay entered into export markets
during the period and stayed in the markets at the end of the period. Entrants-exit also
entered during the period but exited before 2007. Switchers changed their export behaviors
more than once during the period. Lastly, participants are plants that appeared in export
markets only once in the period of analysis.
In Figure 4.1, I present the rank of each type of plants based on value added per worker.
Permanent exporters have the highest productivity during the periods except in 1998 and
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Table 4.4: Plants in the panel and years of exporting
Plants in the panel Years of exporting
No. of
years
Obs. (%) Obs. (%)
13 1,731 15.9 227 2.1
12 547 5.0 99 0.9
11 384 3.5 95 0.9
10 498 4.6 99 0.9
9 450 4.1 91 0.8
8 551 5.1 103 0.9
7 525 4.8 121 1.1
6 678 6.2 172 1.6
5 861 7.9 198 1.8
4 932 8.5 276 2.5
3 1,216 11.1 288 2.6
2 1,245 11.4 424 3.9
1 1,291 11.8 561 5.1
0 - - 8,155 74.8
Total 10,909 100.0 10,909 100.0
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics (Average, 1995-2007)
Number Exporters Non-exporters
A. Total Number of Plants 5,378 (100.0) 1,082 (20.1) 4,297 (79.9)
B. Ownership
- National Private 4,988 (92.7) 867 (80.1) 4,121 (95.9)
- Foreign Private 172 (3.2) 108 (10.0) 64 (1.5)
- Mixed 150 (2.8) 90 (8.3) 60 (1.4)
- State 69 (1.3) 17 (1.6) 52 (1.2)
C. Size
- Small (10-49 workers) 3,795 (70.6) 328 (30.3) 3,467 (80.7)
- Medium (50-149 workers) 1,002 (18.6) 372 (34.4) 630 (14.7)
- Large (¿= 150 workers) 582 (10.8) 382 (35.3) 200 (4.7)
Table 4.6: Plant’s exit and entry for export markets
Year Exit Exporters in
previous year
Exit rate
(%)
Entry Exporters in
current year
Entry rate
(%)
1996 214 1,170 18.3 248 1,204 20.6
1997 225 1,204 18.7 198 1,177 26.8
1998 220 1,177 18.7 160 1,117 14.3
1999 222 1,117 19.9 130 1,025 12.7
2000 234 1,025 22.8 175 966 18.1
2001 208 966 21.5 197 955 20.6
2002 175 955 18.3 245 1,025 23.9
2003 179 1,025 17.5 217 1,063 20.4
2004 200 1,063 18.8 252 1,115 22.6
2005 229 1,115 20.5 237 1,123 21.1
2006 191 1,123 17.0 155 1,087 14.3
2007 203 1,087 18.7 152 1,036 14.7
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Table 4.7: Plant’s type (Average, 1995-2007)
Type
Observations
Employment
Value
added per
worker
Number (%)
Non-exporters 3,682 69.7 460 8.7
Permanent exporters 212 4.0 3,139 9.8
Quitters 289 5.5 1,953 9.2
Entrants-stay 499 9.4 2,092 9.7
Entrants-exit 198 3.7 1,266 9.2
Switchers 256 4.8 1,583 9.4
Participants 198 2.8 866 9.2
Total 5,285 100.0 - -
Figure 4.1: Value added per worker of plants by type and year
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2000. The second highest type is entrants-stay and they showed higher productivity in 1998
and 2001 than permanent exporters. Non-exporters are the least productive type among
them. Other types of plants show fluctuations in their productivity during the overall periods.
Table 4.7 shows the average number of observations, employment, and value added per
worker of each type. Even though permanent exporters account for only 4.0 percent of all
plants, they have the highest productivity and the biggest employment as well. Entrants-
stay are in the second rank in employment and productivity. In addition, non-exporters are
the majority of all plants but show the least productivity and employment.
4.4 SELF-SELECTION
As a productivity measure, the logarithm of value added per worker is used in this paper. I
use the following probit model to confirm that productive plants in Chile select into export
markets during 1995-2007.
Pr(Xit = 1|Xit−1 = 0) = Φ(β PRODit−1 + δ′Controlit−1 + γs + γt + it)
where Xit is a dummy variable for export of a plant i at time t, PRODit−1 is productivity
of plant i at time t − 1, Controlit−1 is plant i’s characteristics at time t − 1, and γs and γt
are dummy variables for sector and year. From this model, I can detect how much plant
i’s characteristics at time t− 1 contribute to plants i’s export decision at time t. Following
Alvarez and Lo´pez (2005), I use dummies for the size of a plant, the ratio of skilled labor to
total labor as plant i’s characteristics as shown in table 8.
Table 4.8 presents the result from the probit model. Compared to other characteristics
such as size and the ratio of skilled labor, the coefficient on productivity has a smaller but
significant effect on the probability of export decision. One standard deviation increase in
productivity raises the probability of becoming exporters by 0.35 percent. It is clear from
the results of the probit model that the more productive plants tend to enter into export
markets.
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Table 4.8: Probability of beginning to export
Independent variable (1)
PRODt−1 0.026***
(0.007)
Mediumt−1 0.480***
(0.026)
Larget−1 0.740***
(0.037)
log( Skilled labor
Employment
)t−1 -0.023
(0.035)
Constant -2.304
(5.187)
Sector Fixed Effect Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes
N 51,384
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Table 4.9: The difference in productivity distribution between exporters and non-exporters
Number of observations Equality of distribution Differences favorable to exporters
Year Exporters Non-
exporters
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
1995 1,120 4,260 0.350 0.000 0.001 1.000
1996 1,158 4,573 0.351 0.000 0.002 0.995
1997 1,134 4,387 0.360 0.000 0.006 0.930
1998 1,073 4,249 0.344 0.000 0.009 0.856
1999 982 4,217 0.373 0.000 0.008 0.913
2000 926 4,113 0.366 0.000 0.003 0.988
2001 921 4,055 0.387 0.000 0.005 0.970
2002 991 4,316 0.359 0.000 0.001 0.998
2003 1,030 4,235 0.337 0.000 0.002 0.993
2004 1,080 4,403 0.350 0.000 0.014 0.700
2005 1,093 4,306 0.377 0.000 0.006 0.938
2006 1,061 4,097 0.377 0.000 0.006 0.948
2007 1,012 3,910 0.372 0.000 0.005 0.959
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Table 4.9 shows the results from the stochastic dominance method. In this method,
I compare the productivity distribution of exporters and non-exporters every year. Since
the hypothesis for the two-sided test is rejected, it cannot be said that the productivity
distribution of exporters is the same as that of non-exporters. In addition, the hypothesis
for the one-sided test is not rejected as shown in Table 4.9. Therefore, the productivity
distribution of exporters stochastically dominates that of non-exporters every year. From
the results, it is confirmed that the more productive plants show a higher tendency to enter
into export markets. Therefore, the clear evidence of the self-selection hypothesis is provided
using the regression method and the stochastic dominance method.
From the probit model and the stochastic dominance method, I confirm that the more
productive plants in Chile tend to participate in export markets.
4.5 LEARNING-BY-EXPORTING
4.5.1 Productivity Growth Between Exporters and Non-exporters
I consider two concepts for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. The first concept is com-
monly accepted by the literatures.4 The learning-by-exporting hypothesis implies that plants
that select into export markets raise their productivity more than those that stay in domes-
tic market. That is, it focuses on the difference in productivity growth between exporters
and non-exporters. The regression method and the matched sampling technique are used to
confirm the first concept.
For the first concept of the learning effect, I examine the productivity growth for different
types of plants in the following regression.
PRODiT − PRODi0 = α + β′TY PEi + δ′Controli0 + γs + εiT (4.1)
where PRODiT and PRODi0 are plant i’s productivity at the final year and the initial year
in the data, TY PEi is a dummy vector for plant i’s types(permanent exporters, entrants-
stay, quitters, entrants-exit, switchers and participants), Controli0 is plant i’s characteristics
4See Aw et al. (2000).
82
at the initial year, and γs is a dummy variable for sector. Since I do not consider the dummy
variable for non-exporters, the coefficient β is interpreted based on non-exporters.
In addition, I examine the annual productivity growth of each type of plants with the
following econometric model.
gi = α + β
′TY PEi + δ′Controli + γs + εi (4.2)
where gi is the average annual growth rate of productivity. I expect that permanent exporters
and entrants-stay will satisfy higher productivity growth compared to other types of plants.
Table 4.10 shows the results of the regression for learning-by-exporting hypothesis. Col-
umn (1) - (4) are the result for Equation (1). In column (1), entrants-stay, entrants-exit,
and participants show significant effect on the productivity growth over the period. Quitter
takes negative effect on the productivity growth. Coefficients for entrants-stay, quitter, and
participants are robust even with other control variables as shown in column (2). Among
them, I am interested in entrants-stay because they may show different results according to
when they entered into export market. Hence, I divide entrants-stay into early entrants-stay
and late entrants-stay. Early entrants-stay enter into export market between 1996 and 1999
which is before the recession. Late entrants-stay enter between 2000 and 2006 which is after
the recession. As I see in column (3), both types of entrants-stay show positive effect on the
productivity growth. However, late entrants-stay is more robust with other control variables
in column (4). That is, early entrants-stay were hit by the recession and their productivity
in the final year did not grow significantly compared to the one in the initial year. However,
late entrants-stay are those that survived the domestic recession and are ready to start to
export. That’s why they improve their productivity significantly.
Column (5) and (6) in Table 4.10 show the result for Equation (2). Permanent exporters
show significant faster productivity growth compared to other types of plants. It is robust
with other control variables in the regression. In terms of increases in productivity level,
entrants-stay show significant productivity growth. However, in terms of average annual
productivity growth, permanent exporters are those that learn by exporting faster than
other types of plants.
Table 4.11 provides the result from the matched sampling technique. I estimate the
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Table 4.10: The learning-by-exporting from the regression method
Dependant variable: Productivity difference Productivity growth rate
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entrants-stay 0.336*** 0.297*** - - 0.003 0.001
(0.117) (0.124) - - (0.010) (0.010)
Early entrants-stay - - 0.389*** 0.355 - -
- - (0.233) (0.236) - -
Late entrants-stay - - 0.322*** 0.281** - -
- - (0.130) (0.136) - -
Permanent 0.238 0.162 0.238 0.162 0.027** 0.023*
(0.148) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.012) (0.013)
Quitter -0.280*** -0.332** -0.280*** -0.332** -0.020 -0.022*
(0.150) (0.157) (0.258) (0.157) (0.012) (0.013)
Entrants-exit 0.301*** 0.253 0.301*** 0.253 0.002 0.001
(0.162) (0.164) (0.000) (0.164) (0.013) (0.013)
Participants 0.410*** 0.400* 0.410*** 0.400* -0.007 -0.007
(0.207) (0.206) (0.000) (0.206) (0.017) (0.017)
Switcher -0.129 -0.226 -0.129 -0.226 -0.009 -0.011
(0.150) (0.155) (0.000) (0.155) (0.012) (0.013)
Medium - 0.034 - 0.033 - 0.002
- (0.091) - (0.091) - (0.007)
Large - 0.162 - 0.163 - 0.007
- (0.124) - (0.124) - (0.010)
log( Skilled labor
Employment
) - 0.026 - 0.026 - 0.004
- (0.044) - (0.044) - (0.004)
Constant -0.167 -0.128 -0.166 -0.127 -0.026 -0.021
(0.258) (0.262) (0.258) (0.263) (0.022) (0.022)
Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3,980 3,939 3,980 3,939 3,980 3,980
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Table 4.11: The learning-by-exporting using the matched sampling technique
Productivity Annual growth rate
s Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
0 0.260*** 0.077 0.015000 0.019
1 0.307**0 0.131 0.018000 0.017
2 0.169000 0.126 0.035000 0.029
3 0.098000 0.131 -0.002000 0.029
4 0.114000 0.118 0.014000 0.033
5 0.071000 0.144 -0.027000 0.018
6 0.310**0 0.153 -0.005000 0.025
7 0.054000 0.157 -0.017000 0.022
8 0.012000 0.148 -0.001000 0.030
9 0.183000 0.166 -0.041000 0.024
10 -0.130000 0.130 0.029000 0.025
11 0.378**0 0.180 0.035*00 0.018
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difference in productivity and the annual productivity growth rate between the treated and
the controls. That is, I estimate βsLBE after s years of entering into international markets
in Section 2.2. For the productivity level, one year after entering into export market, plants
show productivity growth. However, the effect of entry on productivity growth disappears
after the second year. In addition, permanent exporters show higher productivity than
plants which had the similar level of productivity in the beginning. It is also applied to the
productivity growth. Permanent exporters show faster productivity growth than those that
started their business domestically with a similar level of productivity.
4.5.2 Productivity Growth of Exporters
The second concept of the learning-by-exporting hypothesis considers the productivity growth
of exporters before and after entry into export markets. I compare the productivity growth
of entrants-stay to confirm the second concept because entrants-stay serve both of domestic
market and export markets during the sample period. If the previous export status helps
their productivity growth faster, I can argue that exporting experience contributes to the
faster productivity growth of export plants. To see the second concept, I use the following
regression model.
gt = α + βEXPt−1 + δ′Controlt−1 + εt
where gt is the annual growth rate of productivity at time t, EXPt−1 denotes export status
of a plant at t− 1. In addition, I repeat the same regression for early entrants-stay and late
entrants-stay because the short recession can affect the productivity growth of entrants-stay.
Table 4.12 provides the results of the regression above. Column (1) shows the result
for the whole entrants-stay and I see that the previous export status does not contribute
to the faster productivity growth of export plants. Hence, the evidence for the learning
effect for exporters is not found.5 In column (2), I regress the productivity growth of early
entrants-stay on the previous export status and control variables. Similar to Column (1), the
previous export status does not have a significant coefficient for the productivity growth of
5Bernard and B. Jensen (1999) have consistent results using US firm-level data during 1984-1992.
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Table 4.12: Learning effect of entrants-stay
Entrants-stay Early entrants-stay Late entrants-stay
(1) (2) (3)
EXPt−1 0.006 -0.043 0.008
(0.012) (0.063) (0.012)
Mediumt−1 0.037*** 0.057 0.030**
(0.013) (0.037) (0.014)
Larget−1 0.041*** 0.075* 0.027*
(0.014) (0.039) (0.015)
log( Skilled labor
Employment
)t−1 0.004 0.041** -0.002
(0.007) (0.020) (0.008)
Constant -0.106** 0.055 -0.115**
(0.051) (0.197) (0.052)
Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
N 4,863 921 3,942
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early entrants-stay. Column (3) presents the result for late entrants-stay and their previous
export status does not help their productivity grow faster. However, while early entrants-stay
have a negative coefficient on the previous export status, late entrants-stay have a positive
coefficient. That is, the previous export status contributes to the faster productivity growth
of late entrants-stay even though it is not significant. From column (2) and (3), one can see
that the short recession generates different effects on productivity growth of entrants-stay.
The first concept of the learning effect is detected in Chilean plants during 1995-2007.
In the probit model, entrants-stay enjoy higher productivity growth than non-exporters and
permanent exporters show faster productivity growth than non-exporters. In matched sam-
pling technique, I compare differences in productivity between exporters and non-exporters
with similar initial productivities. The productivity growth rate of exporters is faster than
non-exporters, but the learning effect lasts only for one year of entry. Lastly, the produc-
tivity of entrants-stay does not grow significantly faster after entry into export markets.
Apparently, export plants experience higher productivity growth than non-exporting plants
but the productivity of export plants does not continue to grow faster after participating in
export markets.
4.6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examine the self-selection and the learning-by-exporting hypothesis with a
recent plant-level data set from Chile using three different empirical methods. The plant-
level dataset from Chile covers from 1995 to 2007 and Chile suffered from a short recession
in 1999. Hence, I study two hypotheses considering the recession in Chile.
Three empirical methods are used to derive consistent results on firm performance and
exporting behavior. From the methodological point of view, a majority of previous studies
focus on regression method to see the self-selection and the learning effects. The matched
sampling technique is used for the learning effect. Research using the stochastic dominance
method pays more attention to the self-selection. When it comes to the learning effect using
the stochastic dominance method, Delgado et al. (2002) successfully provide evidence of the
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learning effect.
I find evidence that supports the self-selection from the regression method and the
stochastic dominance method. The more productive plants self-select into international
markets. Moreover, the learning-by-exporting hypothesis is supported by the regression
method and the matched sampling technique. After entry into export markets, produc-
tivity of entrants-stay grows more than that of non-exporting plants. While entrants-stay
who entered after the recession show significantly higher productivity growth compared to
non-exporters, entrants-stay who entered before the recession do not show significant higher
productivity growth. I also confirm that permanent exporters during the sample period show
faster productivity growth than non-exporters. Lastly, I confirm that export experience does
not contribute to productivity growth of export plants. However, I see that the previous
export status has a positive coefficient for productivity growth of early entrants-stay and a
negative coefficient for that of late entrants-stay. Even though coefficients are not statisti-
cally significant, while export plants that entered after a recession show faster productivity
growth, export plants that entered before a recession show slower productivity growth.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 2
A.1 SOLUTION ALGORITHM
1. Start with a discretized state space for government bonds on a grid.
2. Calculate the government’s value function in permanent autarky vaut. In permanent
autarky, the optimal wage, labor, and consumption are computed for each state of TFP
shock.
3. Start with a guess for the value of the government, the bond price schedule, the wage
function, and the interest rate on working capital such that V0 = v
aut, q0(B, z) =
1
1+r∗ ,
w0(B, z) = 1, and r0(B, z) = r
∗.
4. Derive the optimal labor supply (2.1) from the households’ problem using the initial wage
obtained in Step 3.
5. Given the value of the government, the bond price schedule, the wage function, and the
interest rate on working capital, we solve the optimal policy function for government’s
bond decisions, repayment sets, and default sets via value function iteration. For each
iteration of the value function, we compute the value of default, which is endogenous
because it depends on the value of contract at B = 0.
6. Using default sets and repayment sets obtained in Step 5, we update the bond price
schedule q1(B, z) via (2.5) and compare it to the previous bond price schedule q0(B, z).
Using q1(B, z), we update the interest rate on working capital r1(B, z) following (2.6).
Using the updated r1(B, z), we update the wage function w1(B, z) following (2.2) and
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the labor supply. In each iteration of the value function, we check whether the value
function, the wage schedule, and the bond price schedule converge, simultaneously. If
any of three fails to converge, we go back to Step 5.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 3
B.1 TABLES
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Table B1: Fitch credit rating conversion table
Fitch Rating Score
AAA 23
AA+ 22
AA 21
AA- 20
A+ 19
A 18
A- 17
BBB+ 16
BBB 15
BBB- 14
BB+ 13
BB 12
BB- 11
B+ 10
B 9
B- 8
CCC+ 7
CCC 6
CCC- 5
CC 4
C 3
DDD 2
D 1
RD 1
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Table B2: Panel regressions explaining creditworthiness with
debt ratios and inequality using Gini data from the World
Bank
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
External debt-to-GDP at t− 1 −0.0214∗∗ −0.0068 −0.0060
(0.0102) (0.0067) (0.0061)
GDP per capita at t− 1 − 15.3950∗∗∗ 14.7987∗∗∗
(2.4341) (2.3667)
Gini at t− 1 −0.1762∗∗
(0.0687)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
No of countries 40 40 40
N 364 364 364
Sample period is 1994-2009. The dependent variable is the
credit rating of country i in year t. Estimation is by robust
standard errors. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Per capita GDP is in logs. (***,**,* represent the significance
level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.)
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Table B3: VAR estimations for different countries
Country ρyy ρyγ ργy ργγ σ
2
y σyγ σγy σ
2
γ
Brazil 0.34 -0.25 0.09 0.64 5.6x10−4 5x10−5 5x10−5 8x10−5
Colombia 0.44 0.09 -0.15 0.33 1.4x10−4 2x10−5 2x10−5 8x10−5
Costa Rica 0.33 -0.07 0.05 0.74 4.5x10−5 -1x10−5 -1x10−5 9x10−5
Dominican Republic 0.26 -0.33 0.07 0.71 6x10−4 -1.3x10−5 -1.3x10−5 9x10−5
Ecuador 0.01 -0.33 0.20 0.82 1.3x10−3 -1.8x10−4 -1.8x10−4 2.3x10−4
Paraguay -0.74 0.24 -0.05 0.73 4x10−4 -4x10−5 -4x10−5 7x10−5
Uruguay 0.26 -0.33 0.07 0.71 6x10−4 -1.3x10−5 -1.3x10−5 9x10−5
Argentina 0.28 -0.56 0.05 0.79 1.2x10−3 -2x10−4 -2x10−4 1.3x10−4
In this VAR analysis, we assume that log output and the inequality follow a VAR(1) process such
that [
log(yt)
γt
]
=
[
cy
cγ
]
+
[
ρyy ρyγ
ργy ργγ
] [
log(yt−1)
γt−1
]
+
[
εyt
εγt
]
where
ε =
[
εyt
εγt
]
E [ε] = 0 and V ar [ε] =
[
σ2y σyγ
σγy σ
2
γ
]
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B.2 PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
B.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is similar to Arellano (2008).
First we show that value of repayment is increasing i asset holdings. For all {y, γ} ∈
D(B2),
y(1− γ)
2
+
B2 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
>
y(1− γ)
2
+
B1 − q(B′, y, γ)B′
2
,
y(1 + γ)
2
+
B2 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
>
y(1 + γ)
2
+
B1 − q(B′, y, γ)B′
2
.
So,
u
(
y(1− γ)
2
+
B2 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
)
+ u
(
y(1 + γ)
2
+
B2 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
)
+ βEvo(B′, y′, γ′) ≥
u
(
y(1− γ)
2
+
B1 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
)
+ u
(
y(1 + γ)
2
+
B1 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
)
+ βEvo(B′, y′, γ′).
Therefore, for all {y, γ} ∈ D(B2),
u
(
y(1− γ)
2
)
+ u
(
y(1 + γ)
2
)
+ βE[θvo(0, y′, γ′) + (1− θ)vd(y′, γ′)] >
u
(
y(1− γ)
2
+
B2 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
)
+ u
(
y(1 + γ)
2
+
B2 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
)
+ βEvo(B′, y′, γ′) ≥
u
(
y(1− γ)
2
+
B1 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
)
+ u
(
y(1 + γ)
2
+
B1 − q(B′, y.γ)B′
2
)
+ βEvo(B′, y′, γ′).
Hence, any pair of {y, γ} that is in D(B2), we have {y, γ} ∈ D(B1).
Let d(B, y′, γ′) denote the equilibrium default decision rule. Default probability satisfies
δ(B, y′, γ′) =
∫
d(B, y′, γ′)f((y′, γ′), y, γ)d(y′, γ′)
Since any {y, γ} ∈ D(B2), we have D(B2) ⊆ D(B1), if d(B2, y′, γ′) = 1, then d(B1, y′, γ′) =
1. Hence, δ(B1, y, γ) ≥ δ(B2, y, γ).
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B.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The bond price is defined as q(B′, y, γ) = 1−δ(B
′,y,γ)
1+r
. Using Proposition 1, we have B1 <
B2 ≤ 0 and δ(B2, y, γ) < δ(B1, y, γ). Hence, we get q(B2, y, γ) > q(B1, y, γ).
B.3 SOLUTION ALGORITHM
To solve the model numerically, we use the discrete state-space method. We discretize the
asset space using a finite set of grid points, making sure that the minimum and the maximum
points on the grid do not bind when we compute the optimal debt decision. Our solution
algorithm for the benchmark model is the following:1
1. Guess that the initial price is the reciprocal of the risk-free interest rate, and the initial
value function is equal to the autarky value.
2. Given a price q(B′, y, γ) and vo(B, y, γ), solve for the optimal policy functions and update
the value of option given as equation (3.10) by comparing vc(B, y, γ) and vd(y, γ).
3. Given the price function, compute the default probabilities.
4. Update the price function using equation (3.9).
5. We simultaneously check whether the initial guesses for price and the value of option
are close enough to their updated values. If not, we update the initial values and iterate
steps 2-4 until both bond price and the value of option functions converge.
1We use the same algorithm to solve the models with a single type of shock. For instance, for Model II,
the price function is denoted as q(B′, y), and value of option for default or repayment is denoted as vo(B, y).
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